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Preface 
 
 
 
In recent years, animal disease calamities have had major repercussions on the European 
society and the market place. Some incidents, such as the 2001 outbreak of foot and mouth 
disease (FMD) in the Netherlands and surrounding countries, have been causally linked to 
imports of live animals. It has become a cause for the European veterinary authorities to 
keep track of the movements of production animals across the globe, and to monitor vet-
erinary developments worldwide. The accession of 10 member states to the European 
Union in 2004 has a potentially large impact on livestock trade in the EU.  
 The present study combines trade analysis with quantitative risk analysis in order to 
reduce the uncertainty on the future risk of importing animal diseases in the Netherlands 
with the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality (LNV) of the Netherlands. A 
more remote purpose was to integrate methods of quantitative epidemiology and economic 
analysis, and to improve the exchange of data on animal diseases within the EU25.  
 The authors have received constructive guidance from several officials in the divi-
sion of Food Quality and Animal Health of LNV: Sikko Beukema who commissioned the 
research and whose place was later taken by Rob Theelen, and technical experts including 
Wim Geluk, George Baars, and Wim Pelgrim. The authors thank the following researchers 
for their substantial contributions to the analysis: Siemen van Berkum and  
Andrzej Tabeau at LEI; Aline de Koeijer, Thomas Hagenaars and Mart de Jong at the Di-
vision of Infectious Diseases of the Animal Sciences Group.  
 The authors wish to thank several resource persons from the realms of business, 
product board and government for their cooperation with the interviews sessions and for 
making material available.  
 
 
 
 
Dr. J.C. Blom 
Director General LEI B.V. 
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Summary 
 
 
 
This study examines the risk of importing animal diseases into the Netherlands through 
livestock trade with a focus on cattle imports.  
 Cattle imports into the Netherlands consist almost exclusively of newborn calves less 
than four weeks of age. The veal industry in the Netherlands heavily depends on animal 
imports for the productive stock. Cattle imports into the Netherlands are projected up to 
2010 at similar volumes as the years before incidents over foot and mouth disease and 
BSE, i.e. annual levels between 550 and 650 thousand head of cattle. In 2004-05, a swift 
recovery of trade is foreseen, followed by stabilisation up to 2010. As more cattle, up to 
25% of imports, will originate from the new member states of the European Union, 
neighbour countries' share will decline. By consequence, the distance and journey time of 
animal transports into the Netherlands are rising. 
 There is a wide range of diseases that are potentially introduced through livestock 
trade. Because a proper quantitative estimate of the risk should be performed on a specific 
disease, three examples have been selected for the analysis: 
1. Leptospirosis represents an infection for which the Netherlands has a disease-free 
 status, whereas the disease is prevalent in most trade partner countries. Moreover, in 
 trade, no guarantees on disease status are exchanged. As a result, large numbers of 
 imported calves are infected. Future study should assess whether the leptospirosis-
 free status of Dutch dairy farms is at risk. 
2. There is a rare incidence of bovine tuberculosis (Btbc) in the Netherlands, and rapid 
 detection and follow-up ensure that the disease-free status is maintained. Disease 
 status differs among trade partners; some countries are managing endemic Btbc 
 through control programs. There is a disease-free guarantee on imported cattle, 
 which, however, cannot be applied to young animals. Inspection services, as  
 presently organised, are not effective in preventing introduction of the disease in the 
 Netherlands. There is a chance that imports of infected calves will result in an out
 break of Btbc in the Netherlands. This depends on the age and destination of cattle, 
 and also on the chances that the disease will spread from one infected farm to others 
 in the vicinity. 
3. Foot and mouth disease (FMD) represents a highly infectious disease that occurs, at 
 present, with none of the trade partners. Problems in the Netherlands arise when 
 there is trade in live cattle in the time span between the start of an outbreak and the 
 detection of the outbreak. This time span is referred to as the  high risk period (HRP). 
 The chances of importing FMD-infected calves depend foremost on the length of the 
 HRP in the country of origin. In addition, the structure of livestock holdings in the 
 country of origin is important: countries with numerous small cattle herds (farms) 
 represent a bigger risk than more concentrated livestock economies. In case of an 
 FMD outbreak in a small-scale livestock economy, it is highly likely that the disease 
 is exported into Netherlands. This is alarming because most cattle consignments are 
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 destined for the densely populated livestock areas. An outbreak in these areas in the 
 east of the Netherlands cannot be controlled before all ruminants within a range have 
 died.  
 
 The following are the most important recommendations for risk management: 
- To support proper animal disease control with the trade partners. The political  
 feasibility of this approach for risk management is probably low. 
- Improved awareness with livestock entrepreneurs in the high-risk areas on the  
 possible spread of animal diseases after introduction in their region. 
- To maintain quarantine measures (such as those under the '21-dagen regeling') for 
 shipments of imported animals that bear increased risk. In any case, there is insuffi-
 cient knowledge on the impact that current exceptions to the general quarantine  
 policy have on the risk of disease outbreaks. 
- The impact of inspections on the spread of animal diseases during imports, transit 
 trade and exports should be optimalised in view of estimated risk. It is recommended 
 that both the risk of disease introduction through trade, and the risk of spread of the 
 disease after introduction are taken into account. For example, the study argues that it 
 is effective to step up inspections on cattle imports into the high-risk areas during 
 months of intensive trade, especially when shipped cattle originate from a large 
 number of farms. Assessments on disease outbreak and spread should drive a risk-
 based inspection system, which indicates the number, the timing and the frequency 
 of sampling. In general, risk estimates may indicate focal points for preventive 
 measures, and also where they may be loosened.  
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Samenvatting 
 
 
 
In deze rapportage wordt verslag gedaan van een onderzoek naar het risico van insleep van 
dierziekten in Nederland door de handel in levend vee, met name de invoer van runderen 
en kalveren. 
 De Nederlandse kalfsvleesindustrie leunt zwaar op ingevoerde kalveren. Er is weinig 
reden om aan te nemen dat de invoer van kalveren (veelal dieren jonger dan vier weken) in 
de komende jaren zal afnemen. Wel neemt het belang van de oostelijke lidstaten van de EU 
als herkomstland fors toe ten koste van de buurlanden. Veetransporten zullen daardoor 
over langere afstand plaatsvinden. 
 Voor de een goede schatting van de risico's op insleep is het type ziekte van belang, 
de analyse van handelsdata is daarom gedaan aan de hand van drie voorbeelden: 
1. Leptospirose is het voorbeeld van een infectie waar Nederland vrij van is en die 
 voorkomt in de meeste landen waarmee we handelen en waarvoor geen garanties 
 worden gevraagd of gegeven. We zullen daarom grote hoeveelheden door handel  
 geïnfecteerde kalveren Nederland binnenhalen. In hoeverre dit leidt tot verlies van de 
 vrije status van melkveebedrijven is niet bekend.  
2. Bovine tuberculose (Btbc) komt in Nederland sporadisch voor en door snelle detectie 
 en follow-up wordt Nederland vrij gehouden van deze ziekte. Andere landen hebben 
 in het ongunstigste geval endemische Btbc met controleprogramma's. Te importeren 
 runderen worden geleverd met garantie van Btbc vrij zijn. Introductie van Btbc in 
 Nederland door nuchtere kalveren kan niet door huidige importcontroles worden 
 voorkomen. De kans dat de introductie van geïnfecteerde kalveren leidt tot uitbraken 
 van Btbc in Nederland hangt af van de leeftijd en bestemming van de runderen (veel
 al kalveren jonger dan 4 weken) en de kans dat infectie bij kalvermesterijen leidt tot 
 infectie van buurtbedrijven. 
3. Mond- en klauwzeer (MKZ) komt niet voor bij onze handelspartners en de proble-
 men voor Nederland ontstaan indien er na start van de uitbraak in de het handels-
 partnerland en vóór de detectie van die uitbraak (de High Risk Period, HRP) handel 
 plaatsvindt. De kans op import van MKZ-geïnfecteerde kalveren hangt af van de 
 duur van de HRP in het land van origine en van de structuur van de veehouderij in 
 het land van origine. Landen met veel kleine bedrijven en veel handel met Nederland 
 zullen vrijwel zeker de infectie naar Nederland exporteren indien ze zelf een uitbraak 
 doormaken. Dit is een alarmerende situatie omdat de meeste transporten bestemd zijn 
 voor de zogenaamde veedichte gebieden in Nederland waar een MKZ-uitbraak niet 
 gestopt kan worden voordat alle dieren in het gebied gedood zijn. 
 
 Uit de studie volgen verschillende aanbevelingen ter verbetering van het beleid ter 
preventie van uitbraken en verspreiding van dierziekten in Nederland: 
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- De ondersteuning van adequate dierziektebestrijding in landen waarmee we handelen 
 is belangrijk om risico's op uitbraken en verspreiding van dierziektes voor Nederland 
 te beperken. Dit is politiek waarschijnlijk moeilijk haalbaar. 
 De kennis over de verdere spreiding van dierziekten na introductie op bepaalde  
 bedrijven zou moeten worden verbeterd. 
- De handhaving van een periode van quarantaine, zoals verplicht onder de 21-
 dagenregeling, lijkt cruciaal, zeker voor dieren met verhoogd risico. Momenteel ont-
 breekt voldoende kennis over de risico's op uitbraken ten gevolge van het huidige 
 ontheffingsbeleid voor de 21-dagenregeling.  
- De controle op dierziekten die in Nederland na bij import, doorvoer en export van  
 levende dieren verder kunnen spreiden moet worden geoptimaliseerd aan de hand 
 van de risico's. Daarbij moet zowel het risico van de introductie door de handel als 
 het risico van verdere spreiding na introductie worden meegenomen. Bijvoorbeeld de 
 controle op runderen ingevoerd in veedichte gebieden binnen Nederland en afkom-
 stig van veel verschillende buitenlandse bedrijven tijdens periodes van intensieve 
 handel zou moeten worden geïntensiveerd. De risico's op introductie en spreiding 
 zouden een risk-based inspectiesysteem moeten aansturen door de aantallen,  
 tijdsstippen en frequenties van bemonstering bij aankomst in Nederland te bepalen en 
 maatregelen gericht op preventie van uitbraken afhankelijk van het risico te intensi-
 veren. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
 
European economic integration has the potential to have large impact on the inflow of live-
stock into the Netherlands. The enlarged European Union bears over 92 million head of 
cattle that can move freely over 25 countries. Our goal is to examine the development of 
Dutch livestock imports on the medium term (up to 2010). The recent EU accession gives 
this research topical interest in view of the sudden surge of imports from Poland in the last 
couple of years, and the historical fact of a sudden influx of cattle from the former DDR af-
ter German reunification. 
 One strong reason to reduce uncertainty with regard to future livestock trade flows is 
the risk of importing animal diseases into the Netherlands. The new member states in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe (NMS) do not necessarily pose an increased risk for introducing 
infectious agents through intra-communitarian trade, given the standardisation of EU regu-
lations on prevention of infectious diseases, detection and surveillance strategies. 
Nevertheless, in view of the anticipation of future risk, the following issues are examined: 
- What is the impact of EU25 accession on animal flows into the Netherlands? 
 The EU accession bears a strong impact on European markets. To explore how  
 markets will respond, first we assess the factors that drive cattle imports into the 
 Netherlands; second, we analyse how these drivers change, and what is the impact on 
 the volume and the regional structure of cattle imports.  
- What is the impact of EU accession on the risk of importing animal diseases into the 
 Netherlands through livestock trade? 
 The risk of importing infectious diseases from NMS is not different from any other 
 EU Member State. In a quantitative risk assessment we project this hypothesis to 
 scenarios of trade growth after the integration of the NMS into the EU, an effort that 
 has never been done before. 
- What options for risk management are available to the veterinary authorities in the 
 Netherlands? 
 The purpose is to indicate which directions current policies could take in order to 
 support the policy objectives at the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality 
 given risk and trade developments in the coming years. 
 
Scope 
This study examines the probabilities of importing animal diseases into the Netherlands 
without exploring the consequences of importing the diseases; a complete analysis would 
have to include the potential consequences in terms of the location, geographical spread 
and duration of possible disease outbreaks.  
 The research cannot cover the full scope of livestock imports and the wide variety of 
infectious agents. Instead, focus lies on cattle imports, which comprise the lion share of 
livestock imports into the Netherlands. Most attention goes out to the new EU member 
states (NMS), of which Poland and the Czech Republic are notable as net livestock export-
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ers. Also we examine whether exports from Hungary and Slovakia into the EU may take 
off after accession. Illegal trade and transit trade are largely ignored in this study due to a 
lack of information. 
 Three animal diseases were selected for the quantitative risk assessment: foot and 
mouth disease, bovine tuberculosis (Btbc), and leptospirosis. For all three, the veterinary 
status of the Netherlands is 'disease-free'. By consequence, there are (trade) interests to 
preserve that status. Figure 1.1 below summarises the features of these infections in cattle. 
 
Organisation of the report 
The report is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reports on projections of Dutch cattle imports 
on the medium term. Chapter 3 provides a quantitative risk assessment for three animal 
diseases. The insights from this chapter serve as input for the risk outlook in chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 reviews current strategies for risk management related to live animal imports in 
view of the research findings. Chapter 6 concludes. 
 
 
 Foot and mouth  
disease 
Bovine tuberculosis  
(mycobacterium bovis) 
Leptospirosis  
(e.g. L. Hardjo) 
Type of infection  Viral Bacterial 
Detection  Often sub-clinical at 
first, possibly clinical; 
usually detected at 
slaughter  
Sub-clinical infection, 
usually detected at 
slaughter 
Difficult to detect from 
symptoms (abortus and 
raised temperature). 
Human health risk No hazards to human 
health 
Zoonotic potential (but 
transmission of BTBC 
from animal to human is 
not confirmed) 
Zoonotic potential: may 
cause illness such as py-
rexia and muscle aches, 
transmitted through urine 
and uterine contents 
Epidemiology Explosive spread 
among animals 
Slow spread compared to FMD 
 
Status in livestock  
exporting countries 
Regular outbreaks 
around the globe;  
potential risk of intro-
duction is a fact 
Regular incidence around the globe; potential risk of 
introduction is a fact 
 
Veterinary control in 
livestock exporting 
countries 
Surveillance, monitor-
ing, prevention and 
control strategies 
Surveillance programs are 
required by EU legislation 
Surveillance is common; 
animals not systematically 
screened before export 
Status in the  
Netherlands 
Disease-free, authori-
ties are very alert; 
regular surveillance & 
monitoring 
Disease-free, authorities 
are alert; systematic check 
at slaughter 
99% disease-free, authori-
ties are very alert and in 
the process of disease 
eradication through certi-
fication program 
Figure 1.1 Characteristics of the animal diseases under study 
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2. Prospects for cattle imports 
 
 
 
This chapter examines the impact of the EU enlargement in 2004 and further prospects on 
live animal flows into the Netherlands.1 The focus lies on imports of bovine animals from 
the new member states of the EU (NMS) in the years up to 2010. We provide a quantitative 
outlook on cattle imports into the Netherlands that allows the managers of veterinary risk 
to anticipate future demands on the system of import risk analysis in the Netherlands. Sev-
eral recommendations are made on the matter. 
 The analysis draws on (i) desk study on cattle trade; (ii) expert interviews with re-
source persons from the realms of government, business and from the relevant product 
board (see Annex C for a list of respondents) whose comments will appear throughout the 
text; and (iii) on a modelling exercise to test selected hypotheses on the volume and the re-
gional structure of imports into the Netherlands.  
 
 
2.1 The Netherlands in EU livestock trade  
 
The Netherlands hold a central position in European livestock trade. Imports and exports of 
live animals amount to several hundred million euro each year. The bulk of live animal 
imports into the Netherlands are ruminants, mainly cattle. In the years 1990-2000, an aver-
age of 640 thousand head of cattle was annually imported into the Netherlands. In the years 
2001-02, when calamities on BSE and foot and mouth disease (FMD) strongly disrupted 
meat markets in Europe, imports plunged. In 2003 trade recovered (table 2.1). Dutch im-
ports largely originate from neighbour countries (figure 2.1). The import volume of cattle 
from Poland doubled for three years in a row up to 40 thousand head in 2003, yet the share 
remains small. 
 
 
Table 2.1 Dutch cattle imports 2000-02, by type (1,000 head) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Calves 580 278 430 534 
Breeding cattle 5 20 1 3 
Other cattle a) 92 32 10 16 
Total live cattle 677 330 441 553 
a) Other cattle covers cattle meant for slaughter, and grazing cattle. 
Source: PVE. 
 
                                                 
1 A slightly altered version of this chapter was presented at the XIth congress of the European Association of 
Agricultural Economics, Copenhagen (23-27 September 2005). 
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Germany
64%
Belgium, 
Luxemburg
13%
Denmark
7%
Poland
4%
France
4%
Other
8%
 
Figure 2.1 The origin of Dutch live cattle imports, 2003 
 
 
Imports into the Netherlands are mostly newborn calves 
Whereas Dutch cattle imports used to consist of a variety of cattle for decades, recent years 
have seen trade narrow down to calves only. In the 1990s some breeding cattle was im-
ported but the Netherlands moved to a net export position in that category. Slaughter cattle 
comprised about 20% of imports until the mid-1990s but volumes are declining ever since. 
A steep rise of slaughter costs after the 2001 BSE and foot and mouth disease (FMD) out-
breaks brought the inflow of slaughter cattle to a complete halt.1
 Calves made up 97% of all cattle imports in 2003. The origin of import demand for 
calves lies with Dutch veal producers, a small but well-positioned subsector of intensive 
livestock production in the Netherlands. Calves undergo six months of fattening before 
slaughter. Most calves are imported as 'newborns' in order to maximise the time of fatten-
ing in the Netherlands. EU legislation permits transports of calves after 10 days. 
 To their surprise, the identification and registration service (I&R) of the Ministry of 
LNV has noticed an increasing inflow of dairy cows over one year of age from the NMS. 
The animals are not imported as slaughter cattle. Despite recent trends the share of animals 
of more than 1 year of age is nevertheless stable at 5 to 6% of imports.  
 Most ruminants that are imported alive into the Netherlands originate from Germany. 
In recent years the import volume of cattle from Poland doubled in three consecutive years, 
reducing the relative share from both Germany and Belgium. At lower volumes than these 
major players, Denmark and Ireland are origin countries of decreasing importance while 
the Czech Republic is on the rise. 
 Dutch entrepreneurs are heavily involved in the logistical services to cattle trade. 
There are an estimated 350 to 1,200 livestock traders in the Netherlands, and about 1,600 
livestock carriers (Bex et al., 2002). One in every 10 carriers is allied to SAVEETRA, the 
largest organisation of livestock carriers, which claims to handle 40% of all transports in, 
towards and from the Netherlands.2 The remainder of transports is done largely by mem-
                                                 
1 Compared to those in Belgium and Germany, producers in the Netherlands make large contributions to the 
reduction of BSE risk through destruction of high-risk parts of the carcass. This makes the slaughter of im-
ported animals unattractive. In response, the Dutch slaughter sector is reducing capacity to 650 thousand 
head, which is the level of domestic cattle supply. 
2 About 25 to 40 of the 175 SAVEETRA members are involved in transports to Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic and Slovakia, according to the organisation's secretariat. 
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bers of the Dutch union of cattle traders (Bond van Nederlandse Handelaren in Vee, 
NBHV), which include professional carriers, traders with own vehicles and the occasional 
farmer. 
 
The Validity of Cattle Trade Statistics 
Before moving on, a few remarks on the quality of trade data. Two institutes in the Nether-
lands officially report on cattle trade statistics, and a third institute is involved in collecting 
trade data. Volumes reported diverge widely among the institutes, which creates uncer-
tainty on the actual amount of imports. Table 2.2 reports on divergences between volumes 
reported. Each source has a specific strongpoint and weakness. Statistics Netherlands 
(CBS) reports official data from customs, both on exports and imports, which poorly re-
flect trade with other EU member states. The Identification & Registration (I&R) service 
of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality produces trade data from their da-
tabase on animal whereabouts. The data are strong on breeding cattle and cattle for 
fattening but weak on slaughter cattle. The Product Boards for Livestock, Meat and Eggs 
(PVE) estimates corrections to the official data from CBS by adjusting these to domestic 
cattle balances and I&R data. This trade report takes I&R data where available or PVE data 
as a second best.1 For a comprehensive analysis of the ruminant sector PVE data should be 
preferred as it is consistent with production and slaughter data.2
 
 
Table 2.2 Diverging Statistics on Cattle Imports 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Source 
CBS 448.109 271.053 223.036 384.488 
PVE 677.000 330.000 441.000 553.000 
I&R n.a. n.a. 468.300 560.178 
Divergence (CBS=100) 
PVE 151 122 198 144 
I&R n.a. n.a. 210 146 
 
 
2.2 Factors driving calve imports into the Netherlands? 
 
The Dutch veal industry is second largest in the EU 
Each year between 1.2 and 1.4 million calves are slaughtered for veal production. Apart 
from the Netherlands, major veal producers in the EU are France (1.9 mln head slaughtered 
in 2003) and Italy (1 mln). Total veal production amounted to 186 mln ton in 2003. By the 
end of 2003, the Dutch stock of meat calves counted 748 thousand head held on 3,250 
                                                 
1 The quantitative risk analysis in chapter 3 made use of the ANIMO database. ANIMO is maintained by the 
Food and Nonfood Authority (VWA) and is fully consistent with the PVE and I&R data for the cases under 
study. 
2 Efforts to improve the consistency of PVE and I&R data are currently ongoing. There is an urgent need to 
develop a new standard to record intra-EU trade statistics in the future. Because of the use of animal pass-
ports throughout the EU25, the cattle sector is one of the few sectors where the changes in trade between 
EU15 and the new member states after EU enlargement can be monitored. This provides additional interest 
into the present enquiry. 
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farms. The province of Gelderland is the centre of specialised veal production. The veal 
industry is characterised by strong concentration. A small number of companies that are re-
ferred to as kalverintegraties (integrated veal producers) produce 90% of domestic veal 
supply. The integrated producers contract farmers, and provide them with newborn calves 
and feed. Calves are fed on synthetic milk for about 6 months at the end of which the inte-
grated producer has the animal slaughtered. Producer prices for veal have been rather low 
in the EU since the reduction of EU-administered intervention prices for meat in the 1990s. 
By means of compensation, producers receive a slaughter premium under the common ag-
ricultural policy. 
 
Veal demand on EU markets is critical to the veal sector 
Dutch households consume just 10% of domestic veal production; 80% is exported to Italy, 
Germany and France; the remainder is exported to other destinations in Europe and the 
Middle East. Over the years, Dutch producers maintain a share in EU veal markets of 15 to 
20%. The market share of the Dutch appears to be stable under fluctuations in total con-
sumer demand in the EU.1 In 2001 the marketing of veal was severely disrupted following 
calamities concerning BSE and foot and mouth disease (FMD). By mid-2004, veal demand 
has fully recovered in France and Italy, while demand in Germany remains below potential 
(source: PVE). To consumers, veal has become more expensive over the years relative to 
alternative meat products; prices in the Netherlands are about double those for beef, and 
about 15% over premium steak prices. 
 
The competitiveness of Dutch veal 
Intensive livestock production in the Netherlands is having difficulties facing the competi-
tion from producers in countries with more land resources and/or cheaper labour, both in 
the EU and abroad. It is expected that pork and poultry production will decline in the com-
ing years (Bondt et al., 2003). While under similar pressure from foreign competition, 
Dutch veal producers expect to be able to uphold their share on the EU market. 
 Several respondents relate the strong position of Dutch veal on the EU market to the 
integrated organisation of production that manages both costs and quality. Dutch veal has 
earned a reputation for high quality, which dwells on technological advance; the advanced 
level of Dutch veterinary control; and is buttressed by substantial investments in quality 
control in recent years. The integrated producers certify their activities under systems such 
as IKB (general supply chain management in Dutch meat); SKV (Stichting Kwaliteitsga-
rantie Kalveren); HACCP; ISO, etc. It seems reasonable to assume that Dutch veal carries 
few risks to consumers and to animal health in Italy, France, and other export destinations. 
In addition, Dutch veal producers are ahead of the EU competition in adjusting their facili-
ties to group housing of animals, which is compulsory under EU law from 2005 onwards. 
 
The productive stock: newborn calves 
Veal production in the Netherlands has its economic origin in the over-supply of newborn 
calves and milk in the dairy sector. While the Dutch dairy sector is still the main supplier 
                                                 
1 The model analysis reported below found that any change in total demand for veal in the EU results in pro-
portional changes to the volume of Dutch veal supply to the EU. 
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of newborn calves to the veal producers, imports have gained importance. The annual 
snapshots at calves supply reproduced in figure 2.2 reveal that domestic supply dropped 
during the 1980s, in relation to the milk quota under the EU common agricultural policy 
(CAP). By 2003, the dairy herd amounts to 1.5 million dairy cows, which produce about 
1.4 million newborn calves. Of the total supply of newborn calves, 30% are used for re-
placement and 70% go into fattening. Due to the diminished scale of specialised beef 
production in the Netherlands, practically all of the 1 million newborns destined for fatten-
ing are supplied to the veal producers. The integrated veal producers have substantial 
buying power. Annually 400 to 600 thousand head (30 to 40% of supply) are imported in 
order to overcome shortages in the domestic supply of newborns, which has the additional 
effect of driving down domestic calf prices. Van der Linde (2004) ascribed the 30% drop 
in domestic calf prices between August 2003 and 2004 to the recent surge in imports of 
newborns from the new member states.1
 Figure 2.3 compares price levels for veal (in live calve weight) across several EU-25 
member states. Price levels are similar in the Netherlands and Italy. There is a price gap of 
over 60% in recent years between these major veal producing countries and Poland and 
Czech Republic, both important regions of origin for calve imports into EU-15. Changes to 
veal prices generally transfer into similar adjustments of the price of newborn calves (Van 
Leeuwen, 1998). Prices of newborn calves are structurally related to the EU intervention 
prices for beef, which in turn affect veal prices (De Bont et al., 2003). As EU intervention 
prices have come down substantially under the Mid Term Review, they offer an unsatisfac-
tory explanation for ongoing price differences. These relate mostly to quality differences of 
the dairy herd in these countries. The issue of breed quality is a minor attribute in newborn 
calve trade. One respondent noted that Dutch importers favour Polish calves, however, the 
reason being their 'robust' constitution. Due to the harsh circumstances on some Polish 
farms only the stronger animals make it to an exported consignment. Part of the price gap 
is explained by the costs of transporting for surplus calves from Poland and Czech Repub-
lic to their outlets in the EU-15. Trade in newborn calves is very mobile. As one interview 
respondent from the realm of trade, a price difference of 3 euro (on a c.i.f. price of, say, 
160 euro) can induce a trader to redirect his transport to a destination where the price is 
best.  
                                                 
1 The analyst stresses the importance of price differences between new member states and the Netherlands. 
Apart from this declining price gap, the years 2003-04 saw a further recovery in EU veal demand, and east-
ward expansion of the EU.  
 19
Dutch domestic 
supply of calves 
(for slaughter)
Live imported 
calves (most 
newborn)
0
250
500
750
1000
1250
1500
1750
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000  
Figure 2.2 Calve supply in the Netherlands, 1980-2003 (1,000 head)  
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 (f)
Source: AGRIS
IT
NL
GR
PL
CZ
 
Figure 2.3 Veal prices in selected countries (EUR/100 kg live weight) 
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2.3 Livestock exports from the new EU member states 
 
Eastern expansion of the European Union on May 1, 2004 added about 10 million head of 
cattle and 30 million pigs to the EU livestock. The cattle stock increased by 15% to 92 mil-
lion head.1 Cattle is free to move within the common EU market. This section examines the 
export supply of livestock in the 10 new member states (NMS) that is available to the 
Netherlands and other net livestock importers in the EU15. 
 More than half of all cattle stock in the NMS is located in Poland (54%). The second 
largest cattle stock is found in the Czech Republic (14%), then Hungary and Lithuania 
(8%), and Slovakia (6%). Between 1998 and 2002 the cattle stock in the NMS decreased 
by 13%. As specialised meat production is quite uncommon in the NMS, most of the cattle 
stock is in the dairy sector. The section below briefly discusses meat and dairy markets in 
the countries that have a history of livestock exports to the Netherlands (which excludes 
Lithuania). 
 
Poland 
Polish agriculture stands near to self-sufficiency in dairy and beef. Beef consumption in 
Poland is low compared to pig meat, which is the country's favourite. Over 60% of meat 
consumed is pig meat. Beef consumption per capita shrank from 20 kg in 1990 to 6 kg in 
2003, and remains limited despite recent welfare increases. Beef production in 2003 
amounted to 275 thousand ton, down from 838 thousand ton in 1990. Animal husbandry is 
done at small scale in mixed farming activities. At less than 1% of farms more than 50 
head of cattle in held; 85% keeps less than 10 animals (source: PVE). 
 After the liberalisation of price support for beef and dairy in the late 1980s, beef pro-
duction became closely tied to the dairy sector. Dairy farming is done on a vast number of 
small-scale farms that are scattered throughout the country. Between 1990 and 2003 the 
dairy herd contracted by 35% to 2.9 million head, and milk production dropped by 27%. 
Of the total annual production of raw milk of 12 million ton, just 6.4 to 7.4 million ton (55 
to 65% of raw milk production) is delivered to the dairy factories; the remainder is con-
sumed or sold at the farm. This leaves ample space for growth of the deliveries under the 
annual production quota of 9.4 million ton. It remains to be seen what will happen to the 
size of the dairy herd as Polish diary increases the volume of deliveries. 
 The growth of deliveries in Polish dairy can be obtained through scale-enlargement, 
or via quality-enhancing inputs (improved hygiene, better feed, etc.). The key question is 
whether the number of diary cows will grow in the coming years, or whether local and for-
eign investors will increase the productivity of the available herd. It is assumed that the 
size of the dairy herd remains stable throughout the projection period. 
 Market forces in the NMS will likely increase the average scale of husbandry, espe-
cially in Poland where dairy production is in the process of undergoing a transformation. 
While market forces will work a bit to assemble consignments from fewer herds, the fact 
that newborn calves are residual to dairy farming impedes a large supply of animals from a 
single farm. 
                                                 
1 Numbers are taken from the December 2002 count in the EU. 
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 Recent years have seen an increase in the export supply of live cattle from Poland. 
While the stock declined by 11% in the years 2000-03, the number of slaughtered animals 
dropped by 22%. Often the animals exported are young animals that are fattened for beef 
or veal in the destination countries. The most important destinations are Italy (48% of ex-
ports in 2002), and Bosnia-Hercegovina (24%).  
 
Czech Republic 
In the last decennium, animal husbandry in the Czech Republic declined with exception of 
the pig sector. Between 1990 and 2003 the stock of beef and dairy was halved to the 
amount of 1.4 million head. Meat production is not specialised but related to dairy produc-
tion. The contraction in the dairy herd is still ongoing at a pace of 20 thousand head 
annually. Milk production was reduced by 30% in the decennium after 1992, beef produc-
tion shrank by 47%. As beef and dairy consumption declined as well, the Czech Republic 
was able to maintain near self-sufficiency in these products. The average herd size on the 
dairy farm is a lot bigger than in Poland. The milk is of better quality due to the abundance 
of cold storage; 80 to 90% of the raw milk supply is delivered to the dairies. The value of 
exports of live cattle varies between USD10 and 20 million since the late 1990s. In 2002, 
live exports amounted to USD16 million worth of mostly newborn calves that were 
shipped to Italy and Germany; the Netherlands were among the smaller destinations (ex-
port value USD1.3 million). 
 
Slovakia 
In the 1990s, animal husbandry in Slovakia underwent enormous change. Between 1990 
and 2003, beef production reduced by 53%, pig meat supply by 20%. During the same pe-
riod, poultry production stepped up by 42%. The livestock reduced to 600 thousand head in 
2003, down from 1.5 million in 1990. Live cattle exports amounted to USD10 to 20 mil-
lion in the last decennium, and are declining further. Italy is the most important country of 
destination, before the Czech Republic and Germany. 
 
Hungary 
Animal husbandry in Hungary is first and foremost an affair of pig meat production. By the 
end of 2003, the total stock includes about 5 million pigs and 700 thousand heads of cattle, 
down from 1.5 million head in 1990. Over 40% of cattle are dairy cows, and 26% are 
calves. The 32% share of other cattle indicates a small but substantial portion of beef pro-
duction. Between 1992 and 2000 milk production was almost stable; beef production 
plummeted by 68%. While specialised beef production is a small sector, about 70% of 
slaughter capacity is up to EU standards, compared to just 35% in Poland. Hungary is the 
second largest exporter of live cattle in the region (after Poland). Annual exports amount to 
USD35 million, down from USD50 million in the 1990s. Croatia has become the major 
country of destination, absorbing a flow of USD23 in 2002. Other destinations for Hungar-
ian cattle are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rumania, Italy, Slovenia, and Greece. 
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2.4 Factors driving Dutch cattle imports from the new member states 
 
Our goal is to examine the development of Dutch cattle imports on the medium term. The 
recent EU enlargement gives this research topical interest in view of the sudden surge of 
imports from Poland and the historical fact of a sudden influx of cattle from the former 
DDR after German reunification. 
 The enlargement of the EU bears a strong impact on European markets. To explore 
how markets will respond, requires a two-stage analysis. First, we assess the factors that 
drive cattle imports. These are generally the factors underlying supply and demand, as well 
as policies and other elements in the economic context. Second, we analyse how these 
drivers change, and what impact this has on volume and the regional structure of cattle im-
ports. 
 From desk study and consultations of experts within the ranks of government, prod-
uct board, business and research, we have found the following to be among the most 
important forces driving the volume and regional structure of cattle imports from the new 
member states (NMS) into the Netherlands: 
- Economic growth: 
 - The demand for veal in the EU15 and NMS 
 - The competitive position of the Dutch producers vis-à-vis veal producers in 
France, Germany and Italy 
 - Alternative uses for land, labour, and capital resources currently tied into the 
dairy sector in the NMS 
- Consumer preferences & consumer concerns: 
 - Diets in the EU shift towards convenience food 
 - Investments that address concerns over food safety, animal health, animal wel-
fare and environmental impact increase the costs of meat supply 
- The Mid Term Review of the Common Agricultural Policy: 
 - In the Netherlands policy support to veal and beef producers remains fully 
coupled to production 
 - Income support to NMS producers is below EU15 levels 
 - The size of the Dutch dairy milk herd, and in relation the milk quota and pro-
ductivity improvements1
- Technological and organisational change in dairy production: 
 - Milk yield per cow reduces the size of the dairy herd in the Netherlands, Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary 
 - Growth of the raw milk deliveries to dairy plants in Poland under the EC-
imposed quotum 
- Integration of the markets in the EU25: 
 - The removal of EU-administered import quota on live cattle, restricting EU 
imports from NMS to 231,000 head each year (excluding the quota of 169,000 
head under GATT), allowing competition to address the biased position of  
Italian importers; as well as remaining tariff barriers between EU-15 and NMS 
                                                 
1 Rising dairy prices and the desire to control the attributes of feed has induced the use of synthetic milk sub-
stitutes. Cow milk remains a substantial input in calf milk. Under MTR policies, dairy prices will drop to the 
extent that the price of calf milk could drop by 4 percent (de Bont et al., 2003, pp. 22). 
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 - The speed at which (unaccountable) price differences between EU15 and NMS 
for beef and cattle melt away 
 
 Table 2.3 indicates the impact of each of these drivers of change. Some factors will 
reduce cattle imports from the NMS region; other will have a positive effect. The follow-
ing sections provide a quantitative outlook on the weight of the various forces on the 
medium term.  
 
 
2.5 Projections of cattle imports 
 
The following sections explore the development of the Dutch imports of cattle from four 
Eastern new member states of the EU up to 2010: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and the Slovak Republic. For this purpose, we will analyses the possible total import de-
mand for cattle as well as the possible changes in the regional import structure, which 
could result from enlargement of EU15 to EU25 and different development of the world 
economy.  
 
Scenarios 
To take into account the possible different macroeconomic development of the economy in 
both the importing region and the exporting region we analyse two possible scenarios, one 
characterised by strong economic growth, the other by weak growth. Table 2.4 presents the 
selected scenario assumptions made for the Netherlands and the new member states. 
 The policy assumptions made for both scenarios are similar: enlargement of EU15 to 
EU25 and mid term review (MTR) of the common agricultural policy (CAP). As the MTR 
of agricultural policy is concerned, we assume the full decoupling of the domestic support 
for all EU15 countries with exception of Denmark, France and the Netherlands. For these 
three countries the cattle and sheep premiums are partly coupled. In particular, 50% of 
sheep and 75% of bulls premiums are coupled in Denmark; suckle cows premiums and 
slaughter premiums for calves are fully coupled and, 60% of other slaughter premiums and 
50% of sheep premiums are coupled in France; 100% of slaughter premiums for calves and 
40% for adult cattle is coupled in The Netherlands. We also assumed the modulation of di-
rect payments, which leads to cut of direct payments by 3% in 2005, 4% in 2006 and 5% in 
2007.1 For new EU members, full decoupling of direct payments was assumed. These pre-
miums are equal to 55% of EU15 payments in 2004 and increase gradually to 95% in 
2010. We have assumed that since 2004 30% of full EU15 rate will be financed from rural 
developments and national funds as was agreed in the accession agreement. 
 For all EU25, the MTR reform of agricultural policy concerning milk and dairy sec-
tor was implemented according to the Luxemburg Agreement. 
 
                                                 
1 For more detail please confer to the latest edition of Landbouw-Economisch Bericht (Berkhout and Van 
Bruchem, 2004, pp. 38-41). Belgium will also keep the cattle premium fully coupled to production, following 
a tripartite agreement of the Ministers of Agriculture of the Netherlands, Belgium and France, see MinLNV 
(2004).  
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Changes to consumer tastes and consumer concerns  
The analysis examines possible developments on the supply-side of the cattle and beef sec-
tor. We can, however, expect that in the period up to 2010 consumer tastes might change, 
that transporters will innovate, and that regulations concerning cattle trade will tighten. We 
explore the consequences of two of these changes on the cattle sector. First, we simulate a 
shift of consumer taste towards other meat products than beef, implemented as a decrease 
of cattle meat consumption by 1% per year throughout the projection period. Second, we 
implement more stringent safety and quality measures concerning cattle imports. Such 
measures increase the costs of trading, and it is the rise of costs that is incorporated in the 
analysis. A differentiation between intra-EU trade and imports from third countries allows 
us to include the beneficial impact of shared EU institutions in the analysis. Trade costs 
within EU25 increase by 1% in 2005 and again in 2007; the costs of imports from third 
countries into the EU25 increase by 2% in 2005 and 2007. 
 
Approach to making projections  
The complete recipe for brewing projections of cattle imports is described in a background 
note that is available upon request. We dwell on a range of economic modelling techniques 
in addition to expert opinion and secondary literature. This makes our approach to arrive at 
economic projections quite common (McCalla and Revoredo, 2001; Van Meijl et al., 
2003). Our aim is to give a quantitative weight to the driving forces of cattle imports in the 
years 2004-2010 that resulted from desk study and expert interview (summarised in table 
2.3, above).  
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Table 2.3 Factors driving cattle imports from the NMS into the Netherlands  
Driver of change Outlook, impact of change 
 Netherlands New Member States a) 
Economic growth Veal demand responds positively to 
strong growth of household income. 
Growth assumptions are comparable for 
all EU veal producing countries, and 
have little impact on competitive posi-
tions of the industries across the EU.  
Income growth will have modest impact 
on domestic beef demand, as prices will 
also go up under EU policies. Under 
strong growth, NMS will gradually lose 
competitive edge vis-à-vis EU15 coun-
tries. Under weak growth imports from 
NMS remain cheap. 
Consumer  
preferences,  
consumer concerns 
The incorporation of concerns over food 
safety, and animal welfare in production 
and transport could raise production 
costs and reduce veal demand vis-à-vis 
less costly meats. A shift of diets to-
wards convenience food will further 
reduce veal demand irrespective of price 
movements. Dutch veal supply will con-
tract. 
Veal consumption in the NMS is practi-
cally nonexistent. Price rises of beef 
will contribute to the shift towards pork 
and poultry meat. 
Mid Term Review 
of CAP  
Meat supply declines due to modulation 
(reduction) of direct payments of 3-5% 
Only gradual build-up of EU support 
levels; strong competition with EU15 
exporters on domestic meat markets  
- beef & veal Veal prices remain unaltered. Income 
support beef/veal remains fully coupled 
to production in NL up to 2010. Capacity 
declines somewhat due to immobility of 
premium rights. 
Beef intervention prices are introduced, 
which further suppress beef demand 
vis-à-vis pig meat and poultry. Live-
stock prices in the NMS converge to 
EU15 average, speed depends on eco-
nomic growth. 
- dairy Milk prices down. NL dairy quota ex-
pansion 1-1.2% reduced supply of 
newborn calves; costs of calf milk de-
crease by 4%. 
Introduction of dairy quota in the NMS. 
Binding (or nearly binding) for all ex-
cept Poland where some consolidation 
of dairy farms is likely; larger compa-
nies will fill the quota; dairy herd 
remains stable 
Technological 
change / Milk yield 
Cow productivity improves 1.8% annu-
ally; combined with quota effect, the 
results is a net annual decline of the 
dairy herd 
Annual productivity growth, in combi-
nation with quota, results in gradual 
shrink of the dairy herd in Czech R, 
Slovakia, Hungary 
Integration of EU25 
market (removal of 
quota, border  
tariffs)  
Removal of the EU-administered quota 
liberalises imports from new member 
states. Dutch share of NMS cattle could 
rise when competing directly to Italian 
traders that historically held quota rights. 
Export flow of cattle to Balkan coun-
tries could shift to EU15 importers 
depending on price gaps. Poland loses 
10% preference margin on EU15 bor-
ders vis-à-vis other NMS, which thus 
become more competitive. 
a) The table covers Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary only. 
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Table 2.4 Scenario assumptions: average yearly growth rates in selected variables in 2001- 2010 period 
 National income 
(GDP) 
Employment Population Exogenous land yield 
in cattle sector 
High-Growth Scenario (HGS) 
Netherlands 2.82  0.60 0.62 0.53 
New member states 
a) 
3.14 : 4.22  -0.37 : 0.25 -0.46 : 0.07 0.01 : 0.59  
Low-Growth Scenario (LGS) 
Netherlands 1.37 -0.1 0.37 0.19 
New member states 
a) 
1.39 : 2.34 -0.59 : 0.06 -0.61 : -0.08 -0.32 : -0.005 
a) Assumptions are country-specific. The table reports the range of assumptions for four NMS: Poland, Hun-
gary, Czech Republic and Slovakia.  
Source: EURURALIS 1.0 (CD ROM), October 2004, http:/www.dow.wau.nl/clue/europe/. 
 
 
 The analysis of scenarios combines two model representations of the cattle market in 
the EU. The one is geared towards studying agricultural relations in Europe (AG-Memod); 
the other, GTAP (the model of the Global Trade Analysis Project), specialises in simulat-
ing global international trade relations.  
 The biggest challenge in this exercise was to estimate the impact of the liberalisation 
of quota for cattle imports from the former EU candidate countries into the EU. Under the 
Europe Agreements it was agreed that cattle imports from Poland, Czech Republic, Slova-
kia, Hungary, Romania, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the EU15 were restricted under 
two quota: 178 thousand newborn calves up to the weight of 80 kg, and 153 thousand head 
of cattle with a weight between 80 and 300 kg.1 Commonly, the quota were filled to the 
maximum. Each year, the Management Committee for Beef of the European Commission 
allocated the import licences to traders from EU15 countries. On historical grounds, the 
lion share of the import licences were granted to traders from Italy (over 60%). Dutch trad-
ers accounted for about 10% of licenses, and have lobbied for a bigger share in recent 
years but with limited success as revealed in Figure 2.4, which shows modest growth of 
market share of the Dutch in EU-15 imports from Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary. Quota removal will have several repercussions on the volume and structure of 
cattle trade. In view of the similarity of veal prices in Italy and the Netherlands, we expect 
to find that the share of Dutch traders grows at the expense of the Italian share.  
 To estimate the implications of cattle imports quota removal for Dutch cattle imports, 
we use our desk study results concerning Dutch cattle imports in 2004. First, we eliminate 
in a GTAP simulation all import tariffs and export subsidies as between the EU15 coun-
tries and ten new members states (NMS) and set NMS import tariffs and export subsidies 
on the average level of EU15 tariffs and subsidies to implement the EU enlargement. This 
tariff elimination, however, alters NMS cattle exports to The Netherlands much less than 
we observed in our preliminary data for the first eight months of 2004. This indicates that 
the quota abolition could have much higher impact on the Dutch imports by country of ori-
gin than it can be achieved by simple by tariffs elimination. Therefore, on the basis of data 
                                                 
1 Under GATT provisions there is a third quota for imports of young bovine animals into the EU, to the 
amount of 169 thousand head. While the quota is open to all countries outside the EU, until Polish accession, 
only newborn calves from Poland were imported under the quota. 
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on preliminary imports in 2004, we adjusted the imports efficiency parameters in GTAP in 
order to arrive at more realistic imports growth rates. Tabeau and Achterbosch (2004) de-
scribe the methodology in more detail. 
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Figure 2.4 Cattle imports from Poland, Czech R., Slovakia and Hungary into EU-15 (USD), 1997 and 
2002 
 
 
2.6 Results 
 
This section discusses the results of cattle import projections; full numerical detail is pro-
vided in Appendix A. 
 
Cattle imports into the Netherlands grow 
A recovery of the total imports after BSE crisis is expected but the imports is predicted to 
stay below the pre-crisis level. Imports will grow from around 587,000 head in 2004 to 
600,000 head in 2007, and 615,000 head in 2010. As figure 2.5 shows, imports will show 
steeper growth in the strong-growth scenario than under weak growth, which reflects rising 
veal (and beef) demand in the EU.1 Dutch veal supply will maintain its share on the EU 
market, despite the fact that meat production in the Netherlands competes strongly with al-
ternative allocation of land and labour resources. Note that we have assumed that 
environmental policies will not put a cap on veal supply in the Netherlands until 2010.2  
                                                 
1 The LGS versus HGS scenarios differ only by macroeconomic assumptions including Total Factor Produc-
tivity. In LGS the CEEC counties have more labour available to produce GDP compared with EU15 then in 
HGS. As the result, in LGS labour in CEEC is relatively less expensive than in EU15 compared with HGS. 
So, the relation between factor prices and so, cattle prices between CEEC and EU15 is better for CEEC in 
LGS than HGS. This why imports from CEEC is higher in LGS than HGS. 
2 Recent LEI research has argued that environmental policies will be critical in determining the scale of poul-
try and pork production in the Netherlands. 
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Figure 2.5 Cattle imports into the Netherlands, 1985-2010 (1,000 head) 
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Figure 2.6 Consumer preferences and cattle imports, 2003-10 (1,000 head)  
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 These prospects of import growth are in stark contrast to earlier estimates by Bondt 
et al. (2003). Based on an extrapolation of the 1992-2000 trend they projected Dutch cattle 
imports to decline to 400,000 head in 2007. We can explain the differences by the follow-
ing reasons: 
- Our data do not confirm the steeply declining trend in cattle imports between 1992 
 and 2000 that Bondt et al. find. Our data, which are combined PVE and I&R data, 
 show strong growth rates between 1996 and 2000, which almost level out the  
 declining trend between 1992 and 1996; 
- Bondt et al. assumed decoupling of price support in all sectors including beef and 
 veal, an assumption that reality proved wrong. In fact, the Netherlands was among 
 the countries where support to beef and veal producers remains fully coupled to  
 production until 2010. Hence, the contraction of stable capacity prospected by Bondt 
 et al. occurs only to the extent of the 3 to 5% cut on farm payments; 
- Calves account for an increasing share in cattle imports, as the Dutch milk herd 
 shrinks and delivers decreasing amounts of calves to the stables of the integrated veal 
 producers. About 90-95% of the Dutch veal supply is exported within the EU25 as 
 well as countries outside the EU. Our analysis reveals that the demand for veal is ro-
 bust throughout the projection period, and recovers from crisis-related low levels in 
 2001-02. The positive market prospects for veal products from the Netherlands on 
 the medium term were not taken into account in the Bondt et al. analysis. We assume 
 that the share of Dutch meat in the global market place depends largely on the costs 
 of producing in the Netherlands vis-à-vis competitors in Italy, Belgium, Spain and 
 elsewhere. According to the simulation results Dutch producers will up-hold their 
 market share, albeit with more ease under weak economic growth.  
 Consequently, cattle imports will grow. 
 
Live cattle imports into Netherlands, 2003 to 2010 
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Figure 2.7 Imports into the Netherlands per country of origin, 2003-2010 
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 There is a kink in the growth rate for aggregate cattle imports into Netherlands. Im-
ports growth from CEEC in 2004 is caused by enlargement and in 2005 by decoupling in 
EU15 (lower subsidies means lower production so higher prices in EU15 compared with 
CEEC). Since 2006, exports prices of cattle in CEEC increase more than in EU15, because 
it was assumed (in EURURALIS and so in this project) that total factors productivity 
(TFP) increase more in EU15 than in CEEC (yearly growth rates 0.53 in EU15 versus 
0.014 in Poland in HGS). In this way CEEC is loosing its competitiveness. 
 
…But shifts in consumer tastes may reduce imports 
In recent years, consumers in the EU have revealed increasingly strong preferences for 
poultry and pig meat. The share of beef and, to a lesser extent, veal in total meat consump-
tion is under pressure due to a desire for reduced preparation time, and more pre-packed 
meals. In addition, ruminant meat consumption has suffered from several scares relating to 
food safety and the feed integrity in the cattle sector. It is quite likely that consumers will 
structurally lower the share of ruminant meat in their diet. 
 We explore the impact of the demand reduction on the Dutch cattle sector. In model 
terms this is done through a reduction in the fixed component of consumer demand by 1% 
for all years of the projection period. Figure 2.6 confirms that imports by veal producers 
are largely responsive to the prospects for the marketing of products. Reduced demand puts 
downward pressure on prices to which producers respond by curtailing supply. According 
to our results, a demand fall-out by 1% results in a proportional decline of Dutch imports. 
 For current purposes, we must assess the impact of shifting consumer tastes on the 
range of uncertainty in the projected imports. The range is consistently widened over the 
projection period through a 1% downward reduction on the projected imports under the 
weak growth scenario. The scenario that examines demand fall-out under weak economic 
growth provides us with a lower bound to our projections of cattle imports into the Nether-
lands.1
 
Imports from New Eastern Member States surge 
In the early years of the projection period Dutch cattle imports from the new member states 
(NMS) step up, then peak in 2005, followed by a gradual decline. Total imports from the 
NMS grow from 40 thousand in 2003 to between 160 and 190 thousand in 2010, depend-
ing on the level of economic growth. The equivalent import share grows from 9% in 2003 
to between 26 en 31% in 2010. Average annual growth in the years 2003-10 is as large as 
200%. Table 2.5 reports traded volumes and import shares in 2002, and projections for 
2006 and 2010 under the assumption of strong economic growth. Most adjustments occur 
in the years before 2006. After 2006 there is a slight reversal of effects. The share of Polish 
cattle will grow from 7% in 2003 to about 27% in 2005, and then declines to 25% in 2010. 
From 2005 onwards, Poland replaces the Belgium/Luxemburg region as runner-up country 
of origin.  
 
                                                 
1 The projected imports in the demand fall-out scenario under weak economic growth differ significantly 
from imports in the high growth scenario at the 10 percent significance level. 
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Table 2.5 Cattle imports into the Netherlands by country of origin under strong economic growth,  
  2002-2010 
     Volume ('000 head)       Share (%) 
 2002 2006 2010  2002 2006 2010 
Germany 236.2 202.7 220.2  50.5 33.6 35.4 
Poland 25.2 145.2 131.5  5.4 24.1 21.1 
Belgium/Luxemburg 124.4 115.9 123.0  26.6 19.2 19.8 
Ireland 4.7 38.3 42.3  1.0 6.3 6.8 
France 32.5 41.7 41.9  6.9 6.9 6.7 
Denmark 38.2 24.1 29.2  8.2 4.0 4.7 
Czech R 4.6 30.1 29.0  1.0 5.0 4.7 
Other countries 2.1 2.8 3.1  0.4 0.5 0.5 
Italy 0.0 0.7 0.7  0.0 0.1 0.1 
Hungary 0.2 0.7 0.7  0.0 0.1 0.1 
Slovakia 0.2 0.5 0.5  0.0 0.1 0.1 
Total 468.1 602.9 622.1  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: 2002 data from the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality: Animal Identifi-
cation and Registration service; 2006 and 2010 data are LEI projections under the strong growth scenario. 
 
 
 Surprisingly, the flow of imported cattle from NMS is bigger under weak economic 
growth than strong growth. This reflects the feature that differences in factor costs between 
NMS and EU15 are more resilient under weak growth - stated otherwise, imports from 
NMS countries remain cheap under weak growth. Imports from Poland, the Czech Repub-
lic and Hungary show particularly strong growth. Figure 2.7 reports on the growth in the 
volume of imports per region of origin, where annual trade is indexed against the 2003 
volume, which reveals the following interesting features in the projections: 
- Dutch cattle imports from Poland and Hungary triple as they respond strongly to EU 
 enlargement. Imports from the Czech Republic jump by 400-500% but the  Czech 
import share remains limited to about 6%. Cattle imports from Slovakia  were next to 
nothing and decline even further. Note that Hungary's trade is booming  but volumes 
remain too small for a substantial share in Dutch cattle imports; 
- The NMS bite share from traditional origin countries such as Germany, Belgium and 
 Denmark. Nevertheless all traditional partners remain important sources of origin as 
 not a single country experiences dramatic decline. Ireland also gains importance. 
 Hence, the import structure broadens over the coming years; 
- While imports of Czech and Hungarian cattle peak towards to the end of the  
 projection period, Poland shows a slightly declining trend from 2005 onwards. After 
 2005, NMS imports diversify in term of origin and the traditional countries recover 
 some of their losses.1
                                                 
1 In the LGS scenario, the Polish exports of cattle to the Netherlands decrease since 2006 whereas exports of 
other analyzed EU10 countries increase. It is caused by relatively high market price of Polish cattle compared 
with other counties and average Dutch import price. Polish price is higher than in other EU10 countries 
mostly due to high prices of primary factors. Land prices are relatively higher in Poland because the yield de-
cease in Poland is much lower than in other countries (in Slovak Republic even an increase of yield is 
assumed). Moreover, the assumed GDP growth for Poland is relatively high compared with Czech Republic 
and Hungary, which creates higher pressure on factors markets compared with these countries. Only Slovakia 
 32 
Causes of growth 
EU enlargement in May 2004 is the prime driver of import growth from the eastern coun-
tries. The enlargement removed remaining trade barriers, notably the import quota of 
500,000 head administered by the beef committee under the European Commission. By 
consequence of price differences between EU15 and NMS, surplus cattle is directed to-
wards the former EU15 countries. Also, it is expected that a larger share of EU imports 
from NMS will flow to the Netherlands such that the Dutch share on the European input 
markets is more in line with the 20-25% Dutch share on output (i.e. veal) markets.  
 A second cause for steep growth is the (partial) decoupling of support to cattle farm-
ers in the EU15 countries in 2005. Lower subsidies means lower production so price 
increases for meat in EU15 compared with NMS. As the price response for 'production cat-
tle' is strongly correlated to veal prices (Van Leeuwen, 1998), we expect a price rise for 
calves in EU15 relative to NMS. This pulls even more cattle from the eastern countries into 
the former EU15.  
 After 2006, we see imports from NMS decline due to limited export supply and a 
loss of competitive edge. Export prices of cattle in NMS increase more than in EU15, be-
cause it was assumed that productivity increases more in EU15 than in NMS.1 In this way 
the NMS gradually lose their competitiveness. 
 
 
2.7 Current policies to address import risk for animal diseases  
 
The trade of live animals across countries bears the risk of transmitting animal diseases 
from the country of origin to populations of people or animals in the importing country. 
Chapter 3 describes several routes of infection. In the Netherlands, the management of im-
port risk, the risk of importing animal diseases through livestock imports, covers at least 
four elements: hygiene of transports; animal identification and registration; veterinary in-
spection; and quarantine. Each of these elements is discussed below. 
 
Hygiene 
In order to prevent the transfer of infectious agent through transport, carriers must abide by 
rules regarding hygiene.2 In general, between each transport the vehicle must be cleaned 
and decontaminated on a designated station. Cattle transports depart from the Netherlands - 
usually without cargo - accompanied by a certified proof of cleaning. Upon return in the 
Netherlands, after unloading cargo, the vehicle is cleaned again. Occasionally, carriers find 
the opportunity to handle additional cargo outside the Netherlands.3 For specific countries, 
                                                                                                                                                    
has higher GDP growth than Poland by contrary to Poland and other analyzed EU10 countries the employ-
ment growth is assumed for Slovakia. 
1 The assumptions on total factor productivity were taken from the EURURALIS analysis. Yearly growth 
rates are 0.53 in EU15 versus 0.014 in Poland in HGS. 
2 Hygiene is denoted in Dutch regulation as reiniging & ontsmetting (RO). 
3 The interior of the transport vehicles is equipped to a specific type of animal in terms of boxes, layers, etc. 
By consequence there are large coordination costs to the handling of cargo outside the Netherlands. The sug-
gestion of a respondent within government that carriers handle packed goods on their outbound itinerary was 
not confirmed by the Saveetra secretariat.  
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where there is increased risk of picking up highly infectious agents, such movements result 
in additional hygienic obligations.1  
 In general the respondents support the continuation of current hygiene policies. Ac-
cording to a representative of the carriers, the re-decontamination is problematic in some of 
the NMS where the national government has not designated official washing stations.2
 
Animal identification and registration (I&R) 
In theory, the veterinary authorities register all animal movements between EU member 
states. Within the EU an animal passport is the vehicle that allows to trace animals to their 
origin. In the Netherlands, these passports are managed by the Identification and Registra-
tion (I&R) service of the Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality. The core of the 
procedure is as follows:  
Step 1: The exporter notifies the planned shipment in ANIMO-Traces on the basis of 
the identification number in the country of origin. If imports originate from 
third countries, animal registration is done at EU border posts (before Polish 
accession to the EU, for most Polish cattle this was done at Frankfurt a. d. 
Oder); 
Step 2: Upon unloading at assembly centres in the Netherlands, foreign passports are 
submitted to the veterinary authorities. Inspectors then undertake a conformity 
check on earmarks and documents, and a veterinary check on the clinical health 
of the animal; 
Step 3: 'Hermerken': issue a Dutch animal passport, register the animal in the I&R da-
tabase (sex; colour; age; farm of origin and farm of destination; carrier 
registration plates etc.), and apply earmarks to the animal. Naturalisation is not 
done if the imported animal is taken straight to the slaughterhouse. 
  Although the final destination of imported cattle is traceable in I&R data, the 
transport within the Netherlands is not registered in the I&R database, except in 
case the animal is exported.3
 
Veterinary inspection 
Regular veterinary checks are undertaken before transport in the country of origin, and 
upon arrival in the Netherlands. In addition, Dutch authorities apply spot checks, that cur-
rently consist of document checks in 5% of the transports while no physical checks 
including sampling of animals for disease are conducted (personal communication  
K. Steijn, Food and Non Food Authority (VWA), 2004). Directive 905/425/EEC allows for 
10% non-discriminatory spot-checks in the country of destination. The Dutch authorities 
are currently not doing any physical checks for animal diseases upon arrival of livestock 
                                                 
1 At the time of the interview these countries were Slovakia and Italy, in relation to outbreaks of swine ve-
sicular disease (SVD) in Slovakia and classical swine fever (CSF) in Italy. 
2 All EU countries should provide official washing stations. At a shortage of such stations washing is possi-
bly done below EU standards. Of additional concern to the carriers is the inability to have their cleaning 
activities certified on the governmental level. 
3 It may well occur that a consignment of imported cattle is dispersed over several farms. In the process, 
some of the veterinary information on the original health certificate is lost. A health certificate from the vet-
erinary service in the country of origin accompanies a consignment of animals. Theoretically, the I&R 
service could register the dispersion of consignments, but at the time of the survey this was not being done. 
 34 
transports except for the cases where animals with clinical signs of disease are detected as 
required by Directive 64/432/EEG. 
 In addition to the veterinary checks there are road checks by the AID, inspection ser-
vice of the Ministry of ANFQ. The purpose of these inspections is to enforce several 
regulations on (animal) transports related to maximum carrier weight; animal welfare; 
travel time etc. 
 
Quarantine 
Cattle farms that have purchased ruminants are kept closed for 21 days under the 21-dagen 
regeling.1 Imported livestock is kept under quarantine on designated assembly centres, of-
ten a large farm owned by a trade house.2 Under the 21-days rule, those farms are closed 
after receiving the imported livestock for 3 weeks before the cattle is released and trans-
ported to a farm in the Netherlands. 
 While there is little discussion in the Netherlands on the need for a quarantine policy, 
various livestock holders have questioned the limited flexibility of current policies. During 
an interview an executive at one of the major veal producers expressed that the company 
would prefer to have quarantine take place at the contract farm.  
 The animal movements on contract farms follow the all-in-all-out principle, i.e. one 
consignment of calves fills an empty stable and after 6 months is taken to slaughter in one 
batch. Because of this, so the producer claims, contract farms are able to organise a quaran-
tine that is equally effective and trustworthy as assembly centres, while causing less 
disruption to day-to-day business. On-farm quarantine requires public trust in private ac-
tions. Trust could, in theory, dwell on the comprehensive certification structures in veal 
production of which Stichting Kwaliteitsgarantie Vleeskalveren (SKV) and IKB-Kalveren 
(Integrale Ketenbeheersing) are the most relevant. 
 
 
2.8 Policies governing animal transports over the long distance 
 
The outlook is for a recovery of cattle imports to their highs from the late 1990s and for in-
creased trade from the new member states. This section examines whether the outlook is 
consistent with the changes that occur to policies and institutions governing cattle trade 
over the projection period.  
 In recent years, the transport of cattle over the longer distance has provoked intense 
debate on both national and EU platforms. Some consider such animal movements out of 
line with the EU-wide efforts to prevent the spread of animal diseases, and to raise the wel-
fare of production animals. Others point to the notion that animal transports are part and 
parcel of the pan-European food market. The livestock carriers themselves oppose to the 
notion that transport is a source of risk and animal maltreatment. At the Agricultural Coun-
cil of November 2004, the political debate in the EU culminated in an agreement on stricter 
                                                 
1 The so-called '21 days quarantaine measure' (Regeling aanvullende voorschriften besmettelijke dierziekten) 
became valid Dutch legislation on 15-09-2004 and implements Decision 2001/327/EC by the European 
Council: concerning restrictions to the movement of animals of susceptible species with regard to foot-and-
mouth disease and repealing Decision 2001/263/EC. 
2 According to the policy 'Regel voor het bijeenbrengen van dieren'. 
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welfare rules for the transport of animals over long distances. Below the import outlook re-
sults are reviewed in view of this agreement.  
 
Journey time and distance 
More trade results in more transport. An increased supply of newborn calves from Poland 
and other eastern European countries reduces the demand for animals from neighbour 
countries. By 2006 the share of our neighbour countries has reduced to just over 50%, 
while that of the NMS will have risen to 25%. Cattle transports from Belgium and Ger-
many into the province of Gelderland, the centre of veal production in the Netherlands, 
span 200 and 500 kilometres, on average. A transport from Poland, say from the Warschau 
area, stretches over 1,200 kilometres and about 18 hours. Prague, the capital of the Czech 
Republic, is 800 kilometres and about 12 hours away. Some tentative calculations with 
these numbers on the data in table 2.6 reveal that the average distance over which import 
animals are transported to the Netherlands will increase from 509 kilometres in 2002 to 
694 in 2006 (if both scenarios are equally likely), a 36% rise.1  
 The journey distance for animal transport in the EU is currently unrestricted. Journey 
times are limited to 19 hours for very young animals, and 29 hours for cattle including a 
compulsory 1-hour stop. Travelling times for drivers are limited to 22 hours. It is common 
opinion that the limits are poorly enforced. 
 Despite a call from European Parliament to restrict the transport of live animals to 
500 kilometres and 8 hours, the November 2004 agreement left current policies on journey 
time and distance requirements unchanged. For livestock carriers that service the new 
member states, the journey time for drivers remains to be the binding regulation. While the 
debate on a more restrictive maximum to journey time and distance will proceed, an EU 
agreement on the matter is not to be expected in the coming years. Meanwhile, efforts will 
focus on the enforcement of animal transport rules. Carriers should prepare to have satellite 
navigation tools implemented in their vehicles by 2009. Transparency and private discipli-
nary rules should provide them with incentives to align their behaviour 'on the road' to the 
public interest. 
 
Animal welfare 
There are basic rules for animal welfare during transport. One respondent stated that the 
maximum load for the vehicles restricts the density of animals. In addition, there are rules 
regarding the supply of water, feed, and fresh air. According to the respondents who repre-
sent carriers and integrated veal producers, animal welfare concerns should be addressed 
through the conditions during transport, rather than the journey time and distance. To some 
extent traders have an operational interest in improving the conditions during transport, as 
far as these reduce stress with the animals. The respondents from the realms of business 
seek to employ technology in order to improve animal welfare during transport such as the 
use of closed cabins with air control. 
 We conclude that animal welfare rules and policies governing transport will not im-
pede more trade. Provided that the Dutch livestock carriers that service the new member 
                                                 
1 Starting from January 2005, haulage vehicles are subject to toll collection on the motorways in Germany. 
This affects all imports from the NMS into the Netherlands. 
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states will maintain their investments in technological improvements of animal conditions, 
the expected expansion over the projection period of animal transports from the east is fea-
sible within the policy context, and likely to occur. 
 
 
2.9 Conclusions 
 
The recovery of Dutch cattle imports continues until 2006 
The study examined the growth and regional structure of cattle imports into the Nether-
lands in the coming years. Still recovering from the low levels of 2001 when BSE and 
FMD crisis disrupted meat markets, total imports of live cattle into the Netherlands will 
grow to around 600.000 head in the coming years.  
 
The share of NMS cattle rises 
Dutch imports from Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary triple after EU-accession. 
The new member states deliver at least 25% of Dutch imports by 2006. After 2006, the 
growth of Dutch imports from the NMS slows down. Trade growth is most resilient, how-
ever, in case of sluggish economic development in the NMS.  
 Already in 2004 Poland becomes the second most important country of origin for 
cattle imports into the Netherlands, after Germany but replacing Belgium as runner up. The 
flow from the Czech Republic also increases, up to levels of Ireland, France and Denmark. 
Trade with some of the minor countries is resilient, i.e. the import structure broadens. The 
uncertainty in the projections - measuring up to 30,000 head in 2010 - is due to macroeco-
nomic growth in the EU25, productivity growth, and developments in consumer tastes and 
consumer concerns. The uncertainty increases further if the demand outlook on the EU 
market is more positive than we assumed. The surge in imports from the new member 
states is stronger under weak economic growth, basically because imports remain cheap 
under an economic slowdown. 
 
EU animal welfare policies will not impede more trade  
More trade and more distant countries of origin result in more transport over longer dis-
tance. The average distance over which an imported animal is transported will rise from 
509 kilometres in 2002 to an estimated 694 kilometres in 2006, a 36% rise. The transport 
of animals over longer distances is subject to debate with respect to the welfare of trans-
ported animals. An agreement of the European Council in November 2004 leaves journey 
time and distance requirements untouched, and focuses on better enforcement of existing 
rules. Provided that the Dutch livestock carriers that service the new member states will 
maintain their investments in technological improvements of animal conditions, the ex-
pected expansion over the projection period of animal transports from the east is feasible 
within the policy context, and likely to occur. 
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3. Quantitative Risk Assessment  
 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter provides a quantitative risk analysis of introducing animal diseases into the 
Netherlands through the legal imports of cattle.1 Also, we aim to generate arguments in fa-
vour of risk-based inspection for infectious animal diseases within the European Union.  
 Focus lies on some of the new EU member states (NMS). The NMS do not a priori 
pose an increased risk for introducing infectious agents through intra-communitarian trade, 
given the standardisation of the EU regulations, detection and surveillance strategies of in-
fectious diseases. It is therefore necessary to compare the country-specific risk of disease 
outbreaks with the risk for introducing infectious agents through the intra-communitarian 
trade. The research for chapter 2 (Phase I) yields the information about trading patterns to 
be used for the risk assessment (phase II), which is summarised in table 3.1. It describes 
four NMS: A, B, C, and D (reported anonymously). 
 
 
3.2 The general structure of a quantitative risk analysis 
 
The general structure of the risk analysis according to the WHO recommendations is 
shown in figure 3.1. 
 
Hazard identification 
During the hazard identification, the hazards are described as to which infectious agents 
(FMD virus, BTBC, leptospirosis in cattle, semen and milk) are studied, where do they 
originate from, when did the last outbreaks take place in the 4 NMS under study (countries 
A,B,C,D), which geographical characteristics play a role in the trading patterns and what 
are the control measures against infectious diseases and their effectiveness in the countries 
of origin. This information is summarized in figure 3.2. 
                                                 
1 We gratefully acknowledge the help of all partners in the process of data collection and the analysis and Dr. 
Armin Elbers for his friendly comments. 
 38 
? quantitative risk analysis (phase II)
? according to WHO recommendations
? general structure: 
? hazard identification
? risk assessment
? release assessment
? exposure assessment
? consequence assessment
? risk estimation 
? risk management
? risk communication
 
Figure 3.1 Structure of a risk analysis according to the WHO recommendations 
 
 
•FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE 
(FMD)
•Virus O
Virus A
Virus C
Virus SAT1
Virus SAT2
Virus SAT3
•OIE code: A010
•Origin: Africa, Asia, parts of 
South America
•M. bovis
•OIE code: B056
•Origin: worldwide
•L. enterica spp. 
•(foreign serovars): hardjo, 
pomona, grippotyphosa
•OIE code: B105
•Last outbreaks and disease status (OIE data):
• FMD M. bovis Leptospirosis
•A: 1971 < 1% 3 bovine cases in 2001
•B:1973 < 1% suspected
•C:1975 free not reported >1998
•D:1973 not reported >1968 
1ovine case in 2001
?hazard identification 
(description of the hazards)
•Geografical characteristics of 
livestock densities (bov. only!!!)
•source: pre-accession reports, 
CVO project:
•A:<40T/km2 
•few regions have high
animal densities
•B: >140T/km2
•few regions have high 
animal densities
•C: <20T/km2 
•few regions have high
animal densities
•D: <20T/km2 -more evenly 
distributed
• Control measures against 
infectious disease are regulated 
by several instances:
• source: OIE, 64/432/EEG, 
90/425/EEC:
• Effectiveness of the control 
measures have been assessed 
• source: FVO mission reports, 
pre-accession reports:
 
Figure 3.2 Hazard identification in the four NMS under study 
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Risk assessment 
The components of a risk assessment as part of a risk analysis are shown in figure 3.3. Re-
lease and exposure assessment were taken together and scenario pathways developed for 
livestock, semen and milk products separately. 
 Initially, it was assumed that the consequences of introducing infectious agents into 
the Netherlands through trade would be negative (outbreaks are possible), but it was be-
yond the scope of this study to assess the consequences quantitatively. The details of 
particular consequences will be discussed at the end of the three quantitative risk assess-
ments separately and in chapter 4 where recommendations for minimizing risks of 
introduction and the consequences are given. 
 Risk estimation is to ask: what can go wrong, how likely is that to happen and what 
are the consequences of the failure? For the purpose of the quantitative risk estimation of 
the two endemic diseases BTBC and leptospirosis, scenario pathways were developed and 
the distributions for risks simulated using Markov Chain Monte Carlo Simulation by 
means of a Gibbs sampler (Spiegelhalter et al., 2000; Vose, 2000), and expected values of 
the distributions returned by the simulations including their 95% confidence intervals. 
 Risk analysis was done exemplarily for the following countries and infectious agents: 
 
FMD: country A 
Bovine tuberculosis: country A 
Leptospirosis: country C 
 
 Note: the risk assessments for semen and milk were not carried further than the theo-
retical framework (see figures 3.10, 3.11 and appendix B because of expected negligible 
risks of introduction of infectious agents under study into the Netherlands. The volumes of 
semen and milk products imported into the Netherlands from the four NMS are very small 
and no fresh milk is imported from the four NMS under study. The processed milk that 
does enter the Netherlands from the 4 NMS under study has received a treatment that has 
inactivated all pathogens under study (see appendix B2.5). 
 The necessity to re-elaborate on the scenario pathways for milk and bovine semen in 
more detail may arise urgently in the near future given the expected expansion of trade 
volumes from the NMS as shown in chapter 2. 
 
Risk communication 
Risk communication is accomplished exemplarily using this report. Possible additional ve-
hicles for the dissemination of the research findings include a consultation with the 
stakeholders to livestock trade in the Netherlands and the EU. 
 
Risk management 
Recommendations for risk communication and for the management of the risks are sum-
marised in chapter 4. 
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?risk assessment 
(where do risks for the introduction of infectious agents come from?)
release assessment (country of origin):
•incidence or prevalence 
•incidence/prevalence in adjoining zones or 
countries 
•evaluation of the veterinary services, 
surveillance programmes and zoning and 
regionalisation systems of the exporting country 
•species, age and breed of animals 
•agent predilection sites 
•ease of agent contamination 
•effect of processing and inactivation
procedures effect of additives or treatments 
•animal health certification policy and practice 
•vaccination policy and practice 
•effect of diagnostic testing 
•effect of therapeutic treatment 
•effect of quarantine (pre- and post-
embarcation, with or without sentinel animals) 
•effect of slaughter inspection (ante- and post-
mortem) 
•effect of temperature and duration of storage
and transit 
exposure assessment (close-up for NL):
•legal import assessed for:
livestock
germplasm (semen)
animal products:
melk
(other products are not assessed)
•illegal import – not assessed
•Contaminated objects (containers and vehicles
from export): not assessed
•Movements of persons: tourism
(difficult to assess)
 
Figure 3.3 Risk assessments to evaluate where the risks for introduction of infectious agents come from 
 
 
Quality of data for the risk analysis 
It has been almost impossible to collect data about the infection status from the four coun-
tries in the study. In case of such a lack of data, it was decided to use the data reported to 
the OIE, ADNS and literature. The quantitative risk analysis could only be conducted ex-
emplarily, because of this lack of data and time. The greatest problem was estimating the 
herd prevalence and total prevalence or incidence of bovine tuberculosis and leptospirosis 
in the countries of origin.  
 If a quantitative risk analysis is to yield concise risk estimates, it is essential to im-
prove the animal disease notification system internationally, including the notification of 
total numbers of herds and animals present, total number of herds tested, number of ani-
mals tested per herd, number of herds found positive, number of animals found positive per 
herd. At this point in time, this type of information can only be collected directly in close 
collaboration with and consent of the countries under study. 
 The attempt of collecting more data has not been accomplished due to a lack of re-
sources and time.  
 
Table 3.1 Livestock imports from the study countries into the Netherlands in 2003  
Country of 
origin 
(year) 
 
Total import 
(head) 
Through-
traffic to  
(head) 
(country) 
Total remaining 
in NL 
(head) 
From  
# of places for 
departure 
To # of places in 
NL 
Type of cattle # of consignments 
 
average # of animals/consignment 
A (2002) 
 
27.507 
 
3.212 (IL) 
 
24.295 
(ANIMO) 
 
 
19 
(14 for cattle 
remaining in 
NL) 
53 for  
cattle remaining 
in NL 
 
beef  
except for 3 
head of  
breeding  
animals  
169 total of which 18 through-traffic 
 
161 animals/consignment (excl. 
through-traffic and breeding stock) 
 
99.9% are calves <3 months of age 
B (2003) 
 
    332       0     332  3  6 beef 
breeding 
8 total of which 
2 w. breeding stock 
 
average of 33 animals/consignment 
excl. breeding stock (66 breeding 
animals/consignment) 
C (2003) 
 
 3.960        0  3.960  9 20 beef 
breeding 
37 total of which 
1 w. 18 head breeding stock 
 
average of  
110 animals/consignment 
excl. breeding stock 
D (2003) 
 
    708        0     708  2  5 beef 8  
 
average of 89 animals /consignment 
Source: ANIMO, Food and Non Food Authority, the Netherlands. 
Note: For the purpose of this risk analysis, the ANIMO data will be used. For the data used in phase II, the ANIMO data are very similar to the I&R data. 
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3.3 Risk analysis for foot and mouth disease 
 
Background information and assumptions for the FMD risk analysis 
The structure of the risk analysis for the risk of introducing foot and mouth disease (FMD) 
virus into the Netherlands is illustrated in figure 3.4 and all background information and 
assumptions will follow in the text. Despite of the doubts about the validity of qualitative 
risk analysis as conducted by Gallagher et al (2002) their study serves as background in-
formation for the risk of introducing FMD virus into the 4 NMS under study, the expected 
number of primary outbreaks in the 4 NMS between 2000 and 2005, the routes of introduc-
tion into the 4 NMS in relation to the routes under study. During the current quantitative 
risk analysis though, an exponential outbreak model was developed to model the number 
of expected infected farms per day after a primary outbreak, the probability of 0 infected 
consignments per day of the High Risk Period (HRP, see below) depending on the chance 
of an infected farm shipping animals during the HRP. 
 
 
Russia/Eastern 
Europe 
(non-EU)
Gallagher et al. 2002
Eastern European country 
group
23% chance of a primary 
outbreak between 2000 and 2005
4 ( 1 – 10) expected primary 
outbreaks
13% chance of causing a primary 
outbreak between 2000 and 2005
likely routes of introduction:
1st: illegal livestock import
4th: animal products (non-meat)
12th: legal livestock import
exponential outbreak
model
input:
trade data country A (2002)
Fergusson et al. 2001
output:
probability for 0 infectious 
consignments introduced into NL
per day of the HRP
depending on 
α (chance of farm being 
shipped/day)
β transmission rate of FMD/day
Horst et al. 1999
Dutch farm density data
destination of 
consignments from 
country A (2002)
information about 
regions of high risk for 
introduction of FMD 
virus
 
Figure 3.4 Structure of the risk analysis for introducing FMD virus through imports from NMS with  
  special reference to country A 
 
 
 Gallagher et al. (2002) reported a qualitative risk analysis for the introduction of 
FMD virus into Europe from third countries where 1 outbreak is expected every 5 years 
originating from Balkan countries and Turkey and secondly from the Russian/European 
group of countries (see below).  
 The four NMS studied during this project belonged to a total of 8 countries in the 
Eastern European Country groups according to Gallagher et al. (2002). Their mean per-
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centage probability of having a primary outbreak of FMD was calculated to be 23%, while 
experiencing on average 4 primary outbreaks (95% C.I.: 1-10) between 2000 en 2005. 
 The four NMS under study have common borders with the so-called Russia/Eastern 
Europe group in Gallagher et al. 2002. The Russia/Eastern Europe group of countries was 
considered to be second in rank after Turkey and estimated to have a mean percentage 
probability of 13% for being a source of a primary outbreak for FMD in a European group 
(among which the Western European group including The Netherlands and the Eastern 
European group including the four NMS under study). The highest mean percentage prob-
ability of being the route of introduction of FMD into a European group country was the 
illegal import of livestock estimated to be 21%. The legal import of animal products other 
than meat ranked 4th and was estimated to have a mean percentage probability of 6% for 
being the route of introduction of FMD virus into European countries from non-European 
countries, while the legal import of livestock ranked 12th and had a mean percentage prob-
ability of 4% only. 
 
The model for spread of FMD virus during the High Risk Period (HRP) 
The High Risk Period (HRP) is the interval of time (days) between the first infection of a 
susceptible animal (bovine only in this study) with FMD virus in one country and the first 
detection of that virus causing a primary outbreak. 
 The HRP for country A was assumed to be between 21 and 30 days, although in the 
stakeholders questionnaire a HRP of about 6 days was filled in for the four countries under 
study. During the UK outbreak of 2001, an infectious period of T= 18 days was assumed 
for the UK (Fergusson et al., 2001). 
 A simple exponential model (see equation 1) has been developed to model the spread 
of FMD virus after the first infection of an animal has occurred. The first infection is the 
start for the so-called primary outbreak. It was assumed that mostly the so-called long dis-
tance spread (f.e. contacts between farms by f.e. transportation of animals) plays a role 
during the HRP (short-distance spread depends on spatial structures of the population1 and 
besides the fact that we did not have the geographical information necessary, short-
distance spread plays a greater role after the termination of the HRP) and that no measures 
of disease combat have been initiated because the outbreak has not been detected yet.  
 From figure 1 in Ferguson et al. (2001) roughly 220 farms were counted that became 
infected during the first 18 days of the 2001 FMD outbreak before interventions could take 
place.  
 Using an exponential model for the spread of the infection right after introduction of 
the virus:  
 
f(T) = e ß T            
 
                                                 
1 A farm density of 8.56 farms with animals susceptible for FMD virus infections/km2 has been assumed for 
a densely populated area in country A in the CVO project (see report of the CVO project, personal communi-
cation T. Hagenaars), wich is very high, but understandable given the low average number of cattle/farm in 
country A. There were 17,895 sheep farms and 760,569 swine farms in country A in 2002. They are suscep-
tible for FMD virus too and take part in the spread of the infection. 
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and e ß 18 = 220 farms, we calculated the transmission rate ß = Ln(220)/18 = 0.3 farms in-
fected by one infected farm per day during the HRP. This rate is calculated based on the 
population of any animal species susceptible for FMD virus including sheep, goats and 
pigs. 
 The probability of Qn infectious transports for export from an infected farm per day 
of the HRP was calculated using equation (2). 
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    equation (2) 
 
T: the HRP in days 
n : number of infected consignments from an infected farm 
n0 : number of farms infected at the start of the primary outbreak 
α : probability that a consignment for export to the Netherlands takes place from any farm 
per day 
 
Total number of cattle herds in country A: 935193 head with an average of 6 head/farm, 
notice:  
 
Total number of consignments from country A to the Netherlands in 2002: 150 (mean: 
12.58 consignments per month, 95% C.I.L 2.2 - 22.87 per month), see figure 3.5. 
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Figure 3.5 Number of consignments per month from country A to the Netherlands in 2002 (mean: 12.58 
consignments per month, 95% C.I.L 2.2 - 22.87 per month) 
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How many farms contribute to a consignment? 
Number of farms contributing to 1 consignment:  
  1  (for an average of 161 head/consignment); 
  1.62  (for 100 head/farm and consignment); 
16.2  (for 10 head/farm and consignment); and  
80.5  (for 2 head/farm and consignment). 
 
Number of farms contributing to 150 consignments:  
    243 (100 head/farm and consignment); 
  2430 (10 head/farm and consignment); and  
12148 (2 head/farm and consignment). 
Note. The average number of cattle consignment is 161 head for country A in 2002 
 
 
 The probability for a consignment being exported from any farm per day is α. We 
calculated 5 different values of this parameter to show the dependency on the number of 
consignments, the number of farms contributing x head of cattle to one consignment and 
the fact that it is very likely that only the fraction of the larger farms will ship animals for 
export: 
α 161 = (150/935193)/365 = 4.4 * 10 –7
α 100 = (243/935193)/365 = 7.1 * 10 –7
α 10  = (2430/935193)/365 = 7.1 * 10 –6
α 2 = (12148/935193)/365 = 3.6 * 10 –4
 
 It can be seen in figure 3.6 that after a HRP of 30 days there is still a 99% probability 
of having 0 infectious consignments per day of the HRP. But given the small herd sizes 
and the changing number of consignments per month, it is more appropriate to make up an 
assumed scenario and re-calculate the results. It is unlikely that all the small farms will ex-
port cattle into the EU, so only a fraction of the farms, those are very likely the larger 
farms, will contribute to the consignments exported into the Netherlands. 
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Figure 3.6 Probability for 0 infectious consignments from an infectious farm given 150 consignments per 
year in country A with an average of 12.58 consignments per month (that is to say that one farm 
ships per consignment only) and the expected number of farms infected by one infectious farm 
beta = 0.3 
 
 
 Imagine a worst case scenario during an intensive month for export with >20 con-
signments (assume: twice the average, f.e. the month of June 2002) per month, where only 
25% of the larger farms (>10 head/ farm and consignment1) export and assuming that only 
¼ of all farms is so large that they can ship >10 cattle at once then the average probability 
for a consignment shipped from any farm per day is calculated as:  
 
α scenario = ((2430/(935193/4))/365) * 2) = 5.7 10 –5
 
 The probability for 0 or 1 infected consignments from an infected farm and the ex-
pected number of infectious consignments after a HRP of 21 and 28 days given a realistic 
case scenario is illustrated in figure 3.7. The exponential spread model predicts f.e. 3557 
farms infected after 28 days without any control measures in place yet. This number in-
cludes any farm with animals susceptible for FMD virus infection (sheep, goats, pigs etc.). 
It can be seen from panel (a) in figure 3.7 that the probability of 1 or more infectious trans-
ports is >1% after a HRP of >15 days and close to 70% after a HRP of 30 days. From panel 
(b) it can be concluded that the highest probability of 1 infectious consignment is 0.36 (SD: 
0.19) after a HRP of 29 days. The graphs in panels (c) and (d) show that after a HRP of 21 
days there is a probability of <10 % for having 1 infectious consignment imported into the 
Netherlands, while after 28 days there would be already 2 or even 3 or more of them being 
imported with probabilities of >1%. It is clear that the length of the HRP is crucial for 
minimizing the risk of importing infectious consignments. 
                                                 
1 Note that given the structure of cattle farms in country A it is realistic to assume that <15% of the farms 
could contribute 10 calves to one consignment at once. In other words, this worst case scenario is still rather 
mild.  
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Figure 3.7 Probability for 0 (a) or 1 (b) infected exports and the expected number of infectious consign-
ments after 21 days (c) and 28 days (d) given a scenario of intensive exports/month (twice 
average), larger farms shipping only assuming that ¼ of the farms is large enough as to be able 
to ship 10 head at once and a beta = 0.3 (number of farms infected by 1 infectious farm/day) 
 
 
 It is very likely that the animals are re-distributed over several Dutch farms in 
smaller batches over more locations later on, but it was beyond the scope of this study to 
gather information about the final destination of the imported animals within the Nether-
lands. The I&R system could provide this information by tracing all animals. Figure 3.8 
illustrates the geographical location for the first destination of the consignments in the 
Netherlands, which often is an assembly station where animals are kept under quarantine 
for 21 days. From the map, it is evident that most of the consignments introduced into the 
Netherlands have their destination in the area of the more densely populated livestock ar-
eas. If an infectious consignment arrived there, it is likely that there will be a major 
outbreak of FMD virus infections in this area as has been stated by the CVO project before 
and that the standard EU measures will not be able to call this outbreak to a halt before it 
reaches the borders of the densely populated livestock areas. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to quantify the size of the outbreak. The reason for the deviation of the high risk re-
gions in this study as compared to the risk reported by Horst et al. in 1999 (the dark areas 
in figure 3.8) is that the report by Horst et al. classifies introduction through personal 
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movement and animal products as being more important for the introduction of FMD virus 
than the legal import of livestock. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8 The geographical location for the destination of the consignments imported into the Nether-
lands (black dots); the dark areas indicate the regions of higher risk for introducing FMD virus 
as reported by Horst et al. 1999, while the circle indicates the highly populated livestock areas 
where most of the animals susceptible for FMD virus are located and consignments from NMS 
are often destinated to. 
 
 
 Horst et al. (1999) calculates the risks for virus introduction from different regions 
(geographical clusters) in Europe and the Eastern European countries among which the 
four NMS in this study. These countries were reported to belong to the cluster of countries 
that have the highest risk of introducing FMD virus into the Netherlands. Within the Neth-
erlands, the western and northern regions are most prone to outbreaks of FMD virus 
according to Horst et al. (1999). According to this reference, it is likely that there will be 
several outbreaks of FMD virus in the EU in the next 5 years. Gallagher et al. (2002) pre-
dicts 1 outbreak of FMD between 2000 and 2005 in the UK based on qualitative risk 
assessment. The Balkan group of countries (Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Slovenia, Turkey) was considered to be the most likely 
group within or adjacent to the EU to have a primary outbreak of FMD and also most 
likely to have the highest number of primary outbreaks. Turkey was considered to be the 
country outside Europe which was most likely to be the source of an outbreak within 
Europe as a whole, and the illegal importation of livestock was considered to be the most 
likely route of introduction of FMD into Europe (Gallagher et al., 2002). 
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Conclusion on FMD import risk 
The risk of introduction of FMD virus into the Netherlands through trade of livestock with 
country A is relatively small (<1%) if the HRP in the country of origin is <15 days, but in-
creases rapidly if the HRP is >15 days. If herds shipped 2 cattle/consignment only, because 
only the small farms ship, then the probability of an infected consignment entering the 
Netherlands will be non-null (>1%) after a HRP of 8 days already (data and graphs are not 
shown, but this type of reasoning is a candidate for the demonstration module that is to be 
developed).  
 Given the past experiences with FMD outbreaks in the Netherlands and the UK, it is 
assumed that 21 days are a realistic value for the HRP in the countries under study (the 
special case of country A in 2002 was studied, but the other countries have comparable 
scenarios). Given the fact that animals start shedding FMD virus before they show clinical 
signs of FMD (on average 4 days before), it is likely that the entire consignment is infected 
by the time it arrives in the Netherlands and that it will not be detected immediately. In the 
case of a primary outbreak of FMD in the NMS under study and a HRP of 21 days, there is 
a probability of almost 10% of importing 1 consignment consisting of on average 161 
FMD infected animals into the Netherlands. It is most likely that this infected consignment 
will be introduced into a Dutch densely populated livestock area (see figure 1) where a 
possible outbreak could not be contained before all susceptible animals were culled in 
those areas as discussed in the CVO project.  
 In the case of a prolonged HRP of 28 days in the country of origin, the probability of 
introducing FMD infected cattle after a primary outbreak of FMD in f.e. country A rises to 
almost 50% and implies the possibility of more than one (up to 4) infected consignment ar-
riving in the Netherlands without being detected. The introduction implies the possibility 
of a major outbreak of FMD in a Dutch densely populated livestock area (DPLA). Unfor-
tunately, the exact consequence assessment of the FMD virus introduction was beyond the 
possibilities of this study. Multiple outbreaks in the Dutch DPLA would paralyse the Neth-
erlands for an indefinite period of time and could cause outbreaks of FMD that will not be 
contained until all cattle and susceptible animals in those areas were culled and destroyed.  
 Non-discriminatory spot checks and sampling of consignments as laid down in Di-
rective 90/425/EEC could be used to intensify inspections during the months of more 
intensive import activities (May and June), when the number of consignments/month is 
high and intensify them for consignments meant to be received in the Dutch densely popu-
lated livestock areas. During those months of intensive import activities, it could be 
appropriate to motivate consignments where only large farms shipped many animals at 
once. 
 
 
3.4 Risk analysis for the endemic diseases Bovine tuberculosis and leptospirosis 
 
In conducting quantitative risk analysis it is common practice to develop scenario path-
ways and estimate the probabilities for the events along the pathways. The present analysis 
covers three scenario pathways for livestock (cattle) imports into the Netherlands.  
 Risk analysis were done exemplarily for the following countries and infectious 
agents:  
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- Bovine tuberculosis: country A; 
- Leptospirosis: country C. 
 
Scenario pathways 
Figure 3.9 summarises the pathway for introducing an infectious agent such as Bovine tu-
berculosis and leptospirosis while being imported from the country of origin into the 
Netherlands, when the introduction goes via livestock imports. The approaches chosen to 
quantify the probabilities along the scenario pathways are described in Appendix B1. The 
results are provided below.  
 
P1 Farm is infected 
P2 routine surveillance detects the infection in country of origin 
    
    
P3 
    
    
export consignment includes animals from an infected farm   
 
 
        
P4 infected animals are detected during the pre-export controls 
 
  
       
P5 infected animals are detected during the transport   
        
    
P6 
    
infected animals are detected during the inspection controls in the country of destination 
  
Figure 3.9 Scenario pathway for livestock 
 
 
3.4.1 Bovine tuberculosis 
 
The approaches and background information for the risk estimation of introducing Bovine 
tuberculosis through the import of cattle from country A are described in Appendix B1. 
Conclusions of the risk estimation are as follows: 
The Netherlands have a bovine tuberculosis-free status and according to the EU regulations 
this status is kept as long as <1% of all cattle farms are positive for BTBC on a yearly ba-
sis. 
 If the consequence assessment for the introduction of BTBC from NMS suggests that 
the intra-communitarian trade will cause >1% of all cattle farms positive per year, that 
BTBC free status will be lost and actions would become urgently necessary. Even if all 
positive animals reported to the OIE for country A in 2002 were spread maximally over 
255 farms, the BTBC-free status would not be endangered in the country of origin and still, 
2 to 10 positive consignments would be exported into the Netherlands per year, given the 
more plausible scenarios where many farms export few cattle at once. 
 The 2 to 10 infected consignments each carry 7 positive animals on average, which 
will not remain alive long enough to cause outbreaks of BTBC in the Netherlands (they 
need to stay in a susceptible herd for at least 5 years and beef calves live for about 6 
months only). They could be infectious though and have a zoonotic potential. So, the risk 
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of introduction of BTBC infected animals is non-zero, but based on previous modelling 
studies (see Roermund et al., 2003), the impact for animal and human health is probably 
negligible. It is beyond the scope of this study though to model the expected number of in-
fections caused by the infected cattle imported while they remain alive in the Netherlands. 
 One thing is for sure: the 10% non-discriminatory spot checks as laid down in Direc-
tive 90/425/EEC will very likely miss the infected consignments and most of the infected 
animals upon entry, because they are too young to be tested anyways. 
 
3.4.2 Risk assessment for Leptospirosis 
 
The pathway that was developed for leptospirosis through the scenario of cattle import is 
the same as shown in in figure 3.9. In Appendix B1, the quantitative risk estimation for 
livestock imported from country C into the Netherlands in 2003 being the source for intro-
ducing leptospira spp. is specified and the conclusions are as follows. 
 The Netherlands employ a certification system for the disease-free status for bovine 
leptospirosis and 99% of the cattle farms are free of leptospirosis as is reported by the 
Dutch Animal Health Service (2004). 
 If the consequence assessment for the introduction of leptospirosis from NMS sug-
gests that the intra-communitarian trade will corrupt this certification system, then is would 
be urgently advisable to take actions such as speeding up the process of establishing a sur-
veillance and eradication system against leptospirosis in the countries of origin. It is 
expected that all consignments originating from country C in 2003 carry infected animals 
younger than 3 months of age (expected number of infected animals imported annually: 
1883; in 2003, they would be distributed over 36 consignments). Those young animals are 
more likely to become shedders as soon as maternal immunity drops around 6 to 8 weeks 
of age so that they could infect others including humans. It is beyond the scope of this 
study to assess the risk of spreading leptospirosis to other premises than the farms receiv-
ing the imported cattle. Given the zoonotic potential of the infected animals, the number of 
infected animals imported annually is unacceptable and yet, this cannot be controlled using 
the 10% non-discriminatory spot shecks laid down in Directive 90/425/EEC. 
 It would be advisable to assess the consequence of corrupting the Dutch certification 
system against leptospirosis by introducing this high number of infected animals through 
intra-communitarian trade. The same is true for other infectious diseases, that are currently 
being erradicated in the Netherlands (BHV1, Johne's disease, BVD/MD etc.) and for dis-
eases with a zoonotic potential (salmonellosis, colibacteriosis etc.). 
 
 
3.5 The other scenarios: introduction of diseases through germplasm or milk  
 imports 
 
A basic theoretical framework for the risk assessments for semen and milk is laid down in 
figure 3.10. It is expected that there are neglegible risks of introduction of infectious agents 
under study into the Netherlands, hence the avenue was not further explored. The volumina 
of semen and milk products imported into the Netherlands from the four NMS are very 
small anyways and no fresh milk is imported from the 4 NMS under study. The processed 
 52 
milk that does enter the Netherlands from the 4 NMS under study has received a treatment 
that has inactivated all pathogens under study. 
 The necessity to re-elaborate on the scenario pathways for milk and bovine semen in 
more detail may arise urgently in the near future given the expected explosion of trade vol-
umes from the NMS as shown in phase I. The risk of importing either of the three 
infectious agents through milk or processed milk products is considered negligible. 
 
 
P1 donor is infected           
P2 routine surveillance detects infection of donor in country of origin 
        
        
P3 shipment includes infected semen       
        
        
P4 infection is detected during pre-export controls     
        
        
P6 infectiop is detected during inspection controls in country of destination  
  
Figure 3.10 Scenario pathway for bovine semen 
 
 
P1 farm is infected 
P2 routine surveillance detects infection of farm in country of origin 
   
   
P3 milk is infected  
   
   
P4 infected milk is mixed with other milk and the mix remains infected 
   
   
P5 milk is processed (f.e. pasteurization) and remains infected  
   
   
P6 infection is detected during inspection controls in the country of 
destination  
  
Figure 3.11 Scenario pathway for milk and milk products1
                                                 
1 During the HRP of an FMD outbreak, raw and pasteurised milk will pose a risk for the transmission of 
FMD for the country of origin and the country of destination after intra-communitary trade of milk and its 
products. There are currently no exports of fresh or pasteurised milk into the Netherlands from the 4 NMS 
under study and the milk products imported in small volumes are all processed so that FMD virus should 
have been inactivated. OIE Terrestrial animal code appendix 3.6.2, article 3.6.2.5 includes the recommenda-
tions for the inactivation of FMD virus in bovine milk. Bovine tuberculosis: M. bovis is expected to be 
destroyed during the heat-treatments required by EU directive 92/46/EEC as long as the process of the treat-
ments are executed according to the regulations (temperature of 71.7 degrees C for at least 15 seconds). The 
same is true for the infectious agents causing bovine leptospirosis. In the case of a higher flow rate through 
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4. Conclusion and recommendations 
 
 
 
4.1 Conclusions 
 
This study examines the risk of importing animal diseases into the Netherlands through 
livestock trade. The International Organization for Animal Health (OIE) defines 'import 
risk analysis' as follows: 
 
 '…the principal aim of import risk analysis is to provide importing countries with an 
 objective and defensible method of assessing the disease risks associated with the 
 importation of animals and their products.'1  
 
 The definition underscores the close relation between trade and risk related to animal 
disease. This report examines both aspects with quantitative techniques. 
 Cattle imports into the Netherlands consist almost exclusively of newborn calves less 
than 4 weeks of age. The veal industry in the Netherlands heavily depends on animal im-
ports for the productive stock. Cattle imports into the Netherlands are projected up to 2010 
at similar volumes as the years before incidents over foot and mouth disease and BSE, i.e. 
annual levels between 550 and 650 thousand head. In 2004-05, a swift recovery of trade is 
foreseen, followed by stabilization up to 2010. As more cattle, up to 25% of imports, will 
originate from the new member states of the European Union, neighbour countries' share 
will decline. By consequence, the distance and journey time of animal transports into the 
Netherlands are rising. 
 There is a wide range of diseases that are potentially introduced through livestock 
trade. Because a proper quantitative estimate of the risk should be performed on a specific 
disease, three examples have been selected for the analysis: 
1. Leptospirosis represents an infection for which the Netherlands have a disease-free 
status, whereas the disease is prevalent in most trade partner countries. Moreover, in 
trade, no guarantees on disease status are exchanged. As a result, large numbers of 
imported calves are infected. Future study should assess whether the leptospirosis-
free status of Dutch dairy farms is at risk; 
2. There is a rare incidence of bovine tuberculosis (Btbc) in the Netherlands, and rapid 
detection and follow-up ensure that the disease-free status is maintained. Disease 
status differs among trade partners; some countries are managing endemic Btbc 
through control programs. There is a disease-free guarantee on imported cattle, 
which, however, fails to apply to young animals. Inspection services, as presently or-
ganised, are not effective in preventing introduction of the disease in the Netherlands. 
There is a chance that imports of infected calves will result in an outbreak of Btbc in 
                                                                                                                                                    
the heaters (plate heaters followed by tubes) pasteurisation will be incomplete, especially or Bovine tubercu-
losis. 
1 See the forthcoming publication by OIE 'Introduction & qualitative risk analysis' Volume I. 
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the Netherlands. This depends on the age and destination of cattle, and also on the 
chances that the disease will spread from one infected farm to others in the vicinity; 
3. Foot and mouth disease (FMD) represents a highly infectious disease that occurs, at 
present, with none of the trade partners. Problems in the Netherlands arise when there 
is trade in live cattle in the time span between the start of an outbreak with a trade 
partner and the detection of the outbreak. This time span is referred to as the high risk 
period (HRP). The chances of importing FMD infected calves depend foremost on 
the length of the HRP in the country of origin. In addition, the structure of livestock 
holdings in the country of origin is important: countries with numerous small cattle 
herds (farms) represent a bigger risk than more concentrated livestock economies. In 
case of an FMD outbreak in a small-scale livestock economy, it is highly likely that 
the disease is exported into Netherlands. This is alarming because most cattle con-
signments are destined for the so-called highly densely populated livestock areas. An 
outbreak in these areas in the east of the Netherlands cannot be controlled before all 
ruminants within a range have died.  
 
 
4.2 Recommendations to further reduce the import risk for animal diseases  
 
Based on the discussions above, this section advises on the prevention of veterinary risk on 
the basis of estimated probabilities of importing animal diseases. Note that we did not ex-
amine the consequences of importing the diseases; a complete analysis would have to 
include the potential consequences in terms of the location, geographical spread and dura-
tion of possible disease outbreaks. While a full analysis provides a more complete start of a 
policy analysis on the management of import risk related to livestock trade, to our opinion 
the quantitative risk estimates presented in this study already contribute much detail to the 
debate. 
 
(1) Managing the expanding flow of trade 
First, it is suggested to opt for controlled growth of cattle transports over long-distance 
rather than reduction of transport. On repeated occasions, the Raad voor Dierenaange-
legenheden1 has advised to reshape meat production and consumption into a regionalized 
affair, thereby removing long-distance cattle transports all together. Our results show that 
the economic incentives for live cattle imports into the Netherlands are strong enough that 
any transport policy or welfare policy to distort these will be difficult to implement. How-
ever, the Dutch veal industry is sensitive to the amount of payments that it receives under 
the common agricultural policy (CAP) of the EU. The agreement of the Dutch Minister 
and his colleagues from France and Belgium to keep producer support fully coupled to veal 
production until 2010 provides incentives to the veal producers in the Netherlands for the 
continued growth of calve transports over long distance. A complete eradication of support 
will reduce Dutch veal production by more than 50%, and end live bovine imports into the 
Netherlands. The less disrupting alternative is to opt for controlled growth of animal im-
                                                 
1 The Dutch Council for Animal Affairs is a forum of experts within the Ministry of ANFQ that advises on 
matters concerning animal health and animal welfare. 
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ports. One way to achieve this is through more stringent policies that address animal wel-
fare concerns during transport.1 Another is to prepare national and international 
stakeholders in the veal industry for the decoupling of payments in the veal sector after 
2010 in order to support the objective of reduced live animal transports. 
 Second, it is recommended to address the illegal trade of livestock and animal prod-
ucts into the EU. This report assessed the risk only of legitimate trade flows, i.e. those that 
occur under approval and administration of national veterinary authorities. Other studies 
stress the risks relating to illegal trade. More effort should be invested into elucidating ille-
gal trade throughout Europe. The identification and registration (I&R) service at the 
Ministry of ANFQ is in the best position to monitor suspicious import flows, and should 
notify these to the risk analysts. 
 
(2) Reducing the high-risk period in the EU25 livestock sector 
The risk assessment has revealed that if the high risk period (HRP) exceeds 15 days, the 
chance of importing an FMD infected animal are non-negligible. There is every reason to 
believe that none of the EU25 countries is be able to detect an infected animal within less 
than 21 days after start of the outbreak. The HRP is determined by the effectiveness of in-
spection and detection given the speed and quality of laboratory tests. An important avenue 
to reduce the risk of outbreak and spread of animal diseases in the Netherlands would be to 
support such services for proper animal disease control with the trade partners. As the po-
litical feasibility for bilateral activities is probably low, reductions of the HRP are best 
promoted at the level of EU25.  
 General measures to shorten the HRP are for example to promote awareness for list 
A diseases and the risk for outbreaks in veterinarians, animal health inspectors and animal 
owners, including public awareness.2 Other avenues for improvement involve animal iden-
tification systems, traceability and movement certification systems. In addition to the 
general measures listed above, the quantitative risk analysis suggests several particular 
measures to reduce the HRP.  
 First, create special risk awareness for the Densely Populated Livestock Areas 
(DPLA). There is a need to create special awareness on the areas and seasons that feature 
enlarged risks. The awareness on the seasonal character of intensive import of livestock 
should be raised in a campaign that emphasises the risks in the densely populated livestock 
areas in the East of the Netherlands. Possible elements of a campaign include limit values 
for the number of transports/ month beyond which increased disease outbreak alertness is 
necessary; a limit value for the number of farms contributing to each consignment (see be-
low) and possible testing of consignments if the limit values are surpassed. 
 Second, to reduce the number of farms that contribute to a consignment. The quanti-
tative risk analysis found that the number of farms that contribute to an imported 
consignment bears a strong impact on the probabilities of importing infected cattle: the 
fewer the number of farms that cattle originate from, the smaller the import risk of infec-
tious agents. Market forces in the NMS will likely increase the average scale of husbandry, 
                                                 
1 At their November 2004 meeting the Agriculture Council of the EU agreed to make animal welfare during 
transport subject to more stringent regulation. 
2 This should include outbreak simulation training, up-to-date contingency plans, rapid cow-side test, diag-
nostic capacity, vaccine stocks and procedures for vaccination in the case of an outbreak. 
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especially in Poland where dairy production is in the process of undergoing a transforma-
tion. While market forces will work a bit to assemble consignments from fewer herds, the 
fact that newborn calves are residual to dairy farming impedes a large supply of animals 
from a single farm. Such findings motivate policies that reduce the number of farms con-
tributing to a consignment. One option is to reject or test consignments if more than a 
threshold value of farms have contributed. Another option is to conduct pre-export controls 
for these above-threshold consignments in the country of origin before shipping for export. 
Third, to relocate assembly centres outside of the densely populated livestock areas 
(DPLAs). Imported livestock is kept under quarantine for 21 days on designated assembly 
centres, often a large farm owned by a trade house. Figure 1 reveals that most of the as-
sembly centres for imported cattle in the Netherlands are located in the DPLAs. To re-
locate the assembly centres out of the DPLAs will contribute to reducing the risk of an out-
break of a highly infectious disease. Possible destinations can be found in Groningen and 
Drente for imports from the Germany, Poland and further East; and in Zeeland for imports 
from Belgium and Luxemburg. If all animals in one consignment are restricted to the 
premises of an assembly centre during 21 days, a possible outbreak is contained to that sta-
tion, and spread of the disease is prevented. If more than one consignment is infected and 
distributed over more than one farm, then the potential outbreak could be multifocal, and 
potentially disastrous. While farms can probably be trusted to organise a quarantine - given 
that they have strong private interests in the matter - the more critical issue is to confine the 
consignments upon arrival on as few premises as possible in order to prevent the infection 
from spreading. A re-location on government notice is a heavy intervention in markets that 
bears resemblance to the policy of 'reconstruction' in Dutch agriculture. We present the op-
tion to suggest the depth of reform that is needed if the policies on preventing disastrous 
outbreaks of list A diseases are taken to their full meaning. A serious appraisal of this relo-
cation policy will require an assessment of the consequences of relocation on disease 
outbreaks, as well as an evaluation of economic and political feasibility.1  
 Fourth, to make more strategic use of the spot checks. The Dutch authorities could 
make more effective use of non-discriminatory spot checks of livestock trade. Currently, 
the number of inspections implemented by the AID is below the EU-imposed maximum of 
10% of all livestock consignments. The authorities might consider some refinement to the 
sample strategy in order to increase the effectiveness of inspections, rather than their num-
ber. One option is to focus on the months of increased risk, e.g. the summer months, or 
periods of intensive imports from selected countries. Another option is to focus on con-
signments destined for the densely populated livestock areas. 
 
(3) Improved risk assessment 
The impact of inspections on the spread of animal diseases during imports, transit trade 
and exports should be optimalised in view of estimated risk. It is recommended that both 
the risk of disease introduction through trade, and the risk of spread of the disease after in-
troduction are taken into account. This implies the challenge of preparing consequence 
                                                 
1 At least one of the two biggest veal producers in the Netherlands opts for another alternative to the 21-days 
rule: quarantine of calves directly on the farm. This is in his interest because the producer can directly start 
fattening program, provide feed himself, and skip the transport between the assembly centre and the farm. 
From an epidemiological point of view we advise against on-farm quarantine. 
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assessments of the risk related to livestock imports into the Netherlands, in order to deter-
mine the spatial and economic impact of outbreak, and to evaluate the benefits and costs of 
measures that reduce the likelihood and the effect of an outbreak.  
 The study argues that it is effective to step up inspections on cattle imports into the 
high-risk areas during months of intensive trade, especially when shipped cattle originate 
from a large number of farms. These are examples of improvements in the effectiveness of 
inspection resources available on imports, transit trade and exports. It is recommended that 
both the risk of disease introduction through trade, and the risk of spread of the disease af-
ter introduction are structurally taken into account. Assessments on disease outbreak and 
spread should drive a risk-based inspection system, which indicates the number, the timing 
and the frequency of sampling. In general, risk estimates may indicate focal points for pre-
ventive measures, and also where they may be loosened. 
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Appendix A Projections of live cattle imports into  
   the Netherlands 
 
 
Table A1.1 Strong Growth Scenario 
(1,000 head) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Belgium/Luxemburg 124.0 109.2 113.6 115.9 117.1 118.7 120.7 123.0 
Denmark 30.8 28.8 23.2 24.1 25.1 26.4 27.7 29.2 
Germany 279.2 247.6 194.8 202.7 206.1 210.1 214.9 220.2 
France 36.5 30.7 41.6 41.7 41.7 41.6 41.8 41.9 
Ireland 34.7 31.6 35.9 38.3 39.0 40.0 41.1 42.3 
Italy 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Czech R 5.9 22.9 31.7 30.1 29.7 29.5 29.4 29.0 
Hungary 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Poland 45.3 113.6 153.8 145.2 141.2 138.2 135.4 131.5 
Slovakia 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Other countries 2.2 2.1 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.1 
Total 560.2 588.1 599.5 602.9 604.7 609.3 615.9 622.1 
 
 
Table A1.2 Low Growth Scenario 
(1,000 head) 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Belgium/Luxemburg 124.0 108.7 106.0 106.2 106.1 106.4 107.0 107.6 
Denmark 30.8 28.3 18.1 18.5 18.9 19.4 19.9 20.5 
Germany 279.2 248.3 201.5 203.3 204.7 206.4 208.9 211.3 
France 36.5 32.1 29.3 29.5 29.7 29.7 29.9 30.1 
Ireland 34.7 30.6 41.0 41.4 41.7 42.2 42.8 43.3 
Italy 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 
Czech R 5.9 22.3 34.7 34.6 34.4 34.6 34.9 35.1 
Hungary 0.2 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8 
Poland 45.3 112.2 159.7 157.9 155.6 154.8 154.3 153.6 
Slovakia 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Other countries 2.2 2.0 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.3 3.3 3.4 
Total 560.2 586.1 595.3 596.6 596.3 598.7 603.1 607.0 
 
 
Table A1.3 Imports from new member states, under two scenarios 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total (1,000 head) 
Strong Growth  52.1 137.4 186.8 176.6 172.1 169.0 166.0 161.7 
Low Growth  52.0 135.4 195.7 193.8 191.3 190.7 190.6 190.1 
Share in Dutch imports (%) 
Strong Growth  9.3 23.4 31.2 29.3 28.5 27.7 27.0 26.0 
Low Growth  9.3 23.1 32.9 32.5 32.1 31.9 31.6 31.3 
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Appendix B The quantitative estimation of the risk of  
   introducing livestock diseases 
 
 
The purpose of this appendix is twofold. First, it provides detail on the methodology of the 
quantitative risk assessment. Second, it gives background information on the epidemiol-
logy of FMD, BTBC and leptospirose, and an overview of relevant EU regulations 
regarding the prevention of introducing livestock diseases. 
 
 
B1 Epidemiological Models and Data 
 
 
B1.1 Background information about the detection of the diseases in the study 
 
Background information for FMD Detection 
An example for a serological test used for the detection of FMD antibodies is the Ceditest 
for the FMD O serotype, sensitivity: 98.2%, specificity 98.9% for bovine samples (Jacobs 
et al., 2002). 
 In the Netherlands, all livestock consignments imported from third countries are 
serologically tested for FMD antibodies and all consignments from the NMS used to be 
tested until May 1st of 2004 (pers. Communication K. Stein, VWA 2004). No true positive 
test results were found since the FMD outbreak in 2001. 
 Sensitivity for clinical inspections during the early stages of FMD is supposedly low 
(sens: <0.1). Ruminants are infectious before they show clinical signs of disease (Blood 
and Radostits, 1989). 
 
Background information for BTBC Detection 
Intradermal tuberculinisation: sensitivity is controversial: 68-95% (Monaghan et al., 1994) 
or 32-99% reviewed by O'Reily and Daborn, 1995). A mean sensitivity of 83.3% is re-
ported in low-prevalence herds (Norby et al., 2004).  
 The sensitivity of this test depends essentially on the potency of the tuberculin used 
and the key for interpretation applied during the testing. If those are below the international 
standards, the intradermal tuberculinisation as a monotest has an even lower sensitivity 
than the average reported. 
 
Background information for the detection of leptospirosis 
MAT: (microaglutination test, a serovar specific test, sensitivity: 67% for individual diag-
nosis in aborting cattle. 
 
The MAT sensitivity is much higher for herd diagnosis if at least 10 animals/herd are sam-
pled as recommended by the OIE terrestrial animal code (Ellis,1986; Hathaway et al., 
1986; Cole et al., 1980); f.e. with a herd prevalence as low as 0.31 (real-world herd preva-
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lences should be much higher, f.e. 80% even in the endemic case) the herd sensitivity is 
still 90% if a minimum of 10 animals is being sampled as recommended by Hathaway et 
al. (1986).  
 
Herd sensitivity is calculated as:  
10  
∑ 10!/(n!*(10-n) * pn * (1-p)(10-n) * (1-(1-sensitivityTEST)n  
n  
 
An MAT herd sensitivity of 90% will therefore be used as worst case scenario for the risk 
analysis. 
 ELISA: individual test diagnosis has a sensitivity of 84.6% (95% CI: 85.6%-90.8%), 
but the less sensitive MAT is used more commonly for screening purposes (Woodward et 
al., 1997). 
 
 
B1.2 Approaches for the risk estimation of endemic diseases 
 
For the purpose of the quantitative risk estimation of BTBC and leptospirosis, scenario 
pathways were developed and the distributions for risks simulated using Markov Chain 
Monte Carlo Simulation by means of a Gibbs sampler (Spiegelhalter et al., 2000; Vose, 
2000), expected values of the distributions returned by the simulations including their 95% 
confidence intervals. 
 Approaches for calculating probabilities of events, simulating distributions, medians, 
calculating expected values and variance during the risk estimations are: 
 
(A) 
Probability of no events in a set of n trials 
p = (1 – p) n
 
Probability of at least 1 event in n trials: 
q = 1 - (1 – p) n  
 
(B) 
Binomial distribution: 
X ~Bin(n,p) 
P(X = m) = ( ) ( )( )mnnnm pp −−1  
 
n: total population 
m: number sampled 
p: proportion positives (prevalence) 
 
Expected number of positive trials out of the total tested (for large n!): 
EX = n p 
Variance: 
Var X = n p (1 – p)= n p q 
(C) 
Beta distribution: 
X ~ Beta(a,b) 
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P(X) = ( ) ( ) ( )( )11 1,
1 −− − ba xx
baB
 
 
Expected value: 
EX = ( )ba
a
+
 
Variance: 
Var X = ab (a + b)–2 (a + b + 1)-1
 
From Vose (2000): 
a = number of positive events + 1 
b = number of animals tested – number of positive events + 1 
 
(D) 
Calculation of herd sensitivity of a test when n cattle are tested out of a total population Nt using a test with 
sensitivity s<100% (an imperfect test) and herd prevalence p: 
 
herd sensitivity = ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )nnNtnNtn spp −−− − 111  
 
(E): 
Calculation of the probability (1 - Q1) that any farm (infected or non infected) contributing shipments of x 
cattle to 1 consignment exported to the Netherlands send at least one shipment including infected animals so 
that the consignment is infected given an average herd prevalence pp<100% and a proportion q of infected 
herds in the population. 
(pp = 70% for BTBC, Emmerzaal et al. 1994). 
 
Q1 = ( ) ( )( ) ( )ixiinnin ppqpp −+  
 
np  is the probability that only non infected farms ship cattle for 1 consignment while the rest of the terms for 
Q1 calculates the probability that none of the infected herds will ship infected animals  
 
with: 
n: farms shipping per consignment exported 
x: number of animals shipped per farm for 1 consignment 
1-pp: herd prevalence of infection in population 
pp: proportion of non infected animals per herd 
q: proportion of infected herds in the population 
p: proportion of non infected herds in the population 
i: running number of trials until reaching n total 
 
for y consignments the total probability 1 - Q1y of at least one consignment being infected is calculated as: 
 
Q1y = y Q1  
 
With: y : number of consignments exported during a certain period. 
 
 The methods described above were applied for the conduction of the risk estimation 
the scenario pathways as shown in the main text (figures 3.9 to 3.11). Distinctions were 
made between input for the risk estimation, assumptions, approaches, output and com-
ments at each step of the calculations.  
 64 
 
B1.3 The quantitative risk estimation for livestock imported from country A into the 
 Netherlands in 2002 being the source for introducing bovine tuberculosis  
 (M. bovis) 
 
P1 
P2 
Farm is infected 
Routine surveillance detects infection in the country of origin 
 input assume approach risk estimation output comments 
 country A 
(2002): 
5.420.987 total 
cattle population 
(110.078 beef 
calves) 
935.193 total 
number of bovine 
herds (average 6 
head/farm) 
 
1/3 of population 
>6 weeks is 
tested using  the 
intradermal 
monotest (1) 
 
i.e. 311731 herds 
/ year are tested 
 
1 herd (255 
animals) was 
found to be 
infected (2) 
 
 
 
 
Calves <3 
m old are 
representat
ive for the 
infection 
status of 
the 
population 
 
 
Sensitivity 
of the 
intradermal 
monotest on 
low prev. 
herds is on 
average 
83.3% , min 
68%, max. 
95% (3), (4) 
 
All 
animals 
reported 
originated 
from 1 
herd 
(C ) 
with 
Beta(2,311731) 
 
 
 
 
0.0000064 * 311731= 
 
 
 
only 1/3 of the farms 
were tested, so -? 
 
 
 
(A) 
calculate the probability 
of missing 6 out of 
311731   
 
 
 
 
(C ) 
with 
Beta(256,311477) 
 
0.00008212 * 311731= 
 
 
 
 
 
only 1/3 of the farms 
were tested, so -? 
 
 
 
 
 
(A) 
calculate the probability 
of missing 768 out of 
311731  
Expected proportion of 
infected farms in 2002: 
0.0000064  
(SD: 0.0000045) 
 
 
 
Expected number of 
infected farms out of the 
farms tested in 2002: 
2 (max. 5) 
 
6 (max. 14) infected farms 
total are expected in 2002 
 
 
pmiss = 0.99988, that is to 
say that the 6 farms are 
missed  by routine 
surveillance with almost 
certainty. 
 
 
 
Worst case scenario: 
255 positive animals are 
from 255 different farms:  
Expected proportion of 
infected farms in 2002: 
0.000821  
(SD: 0.0000513) 
 
Expected number of 
infected farms out of the 
farms tested in 2002: 
256 (max. 288) 
 
768 (max. 864) infected 
farms total are expected in 
2002 
 
pmiss = 0.150404, that is to 
say that there is a 15% 
chance that the routine 
surveillance system will 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A worst case 
scenario 
would 
assume that 
the 255 
positive 
animals 
originate 
from 255 
different 
farms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Need to 
inquire data 
to calculate 
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miss all of the 768 infected 
farms. 
 
 
the exact 
prevalence 
of BTBC in 
NMS and 
make 
recommenda
tions for the 
routine 
surveillance 
system 
      
P3 Export consignment includes animals from infected farms 
 input assume approach risk estimation output comments 
 24295 beef cattle 
exported  from A 
to NL in 2002 (s. 
table 1), (5) 
 
150 
consignments of 
beef cattle  
average of 161 
cattle/consignme
nt 
 (99.9% of cattle 
<3 months old) 
 
1 consignment of 
3 head of 
breeding cattle 
(we neglected 
them because 
BTBC is a low 
prevalence 
disease,  
cattle/farm 
shipped for 
1 c 
onsignmen
t: 
100  
10  
2  
 
herd 
prevalence 
is 70% 
(4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Number of farms 
contributing to 150 and 
to 1 consignments 
respectively (6): 
 
    243;     1.62 
  2430;   16.2 
12145;   80.5 
 
(E): 
 
make a difference 
between “shipment” 
from a farm and the 
“consignment” 
(consisting of 
shipments) exported 
into the Netherlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive animals are 
spread maximally over 
farms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1 
probability that 1.62 
infected or non infected 
herds ship 100 animals  
each and that at least 1 
shipment is infected so that 
the consignment is 
infected: 
0.0000128  
 
expected number of 
infected consignments out 
of 150 total in 2002: 
0.001925 
(SD: 0.0439), i.e. 1.9 
infected consignments 
every 1000 years 
 
 
[Worst case with 768 
infected farms in country 
A in 2002: 
probability that 1.62 
infected or non infected 
herds ship 100 animals 
each and that at least 1 
shipment is infected so that 
the consignment is 
infected: 
0.00164 (very small!) 
 
expected number of 
Data about 
geographical 
clusters of 
farms 
shipping cattle 
for export  
could be 
included in 
the 
calculations at 
this point. 
 
The first case 
is not realistic, 
because the 
farms are on 
average too 
small to ship 
100 animals at 
once. 
 
 
 
 
 
Stop 
calculation 
here! 
 
In 99.9% of 
the cases, we 
are drawing 
calves from 
the population 
of calves 
really! So, 10 
calves per 
farm should 
come from 
large farms 
only. 
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Fraction of 
larger 
farms 
(>100 
head/farm) 
is 0.25 of 
the total 
population. 
It may be a 
fraction of 
15% only 
(see phase 
I p.22) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(E): 
It is more plausible that 
the larger farms (>100 
head) will ship at least 
10 animals at once and 
that not all of the very 
small farms will export 
cattle. 
 
 
 
 
0.0000099748* 150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(B): ~dbin (0.7,10) 
assuming that n=10 
cattle are shipped from 
each farm and that the  
herd prevalence is 
p=70% (4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7*16.2*0.0000064/ 
(1-(1-0.0000064)16.2) 
 
(1-(1-0.0000064)16.2) 
is probability for min   
1 pos farm in 1 cons, 
i.e. that cons is   
positive 
 
 
Positive animals are 
spread maximally over 
infected consignments out 
of 150 total in 2002: 
0.24627, i.e. 2.5 % chance 
of 1 infected consignment 
every year. 
(SD: 0.4958), i.e. max 1.24 
infected consignments per 
year.]  
 
Case 2 
probability that 16.2 
infected or non infected 
herds ship 10 animals each 
and that at least 1 shipment 
is infected so that the 
consignment is infected: 
0.0000099748 
 
expected number of 
infected consignments out 
of 150 total in 2002: 
0.0014961  
(SD: 0.122231) 
interpretation: 
1.5 infected  consignments 
every 1000 years  would 
be exported to NL… 
 
 
expected number of 
infected animals (10 
shipped per farm) per 
shipment from an infected 
farm: 
7 animals (SD: 1.45, 95% 
C.I.: 4 - 10) 
and 
expected number of 
infected animals in an  
infected consignment if 
16.2 farms contribute to 
each consignment : 
7.000341 
animals/consignment 
(7/161=0.0435, i.e. 
prevalence in inf 
consignment, which is) 
<<18% (s.below)  
 
 
 
 
Worst case with 768 
infected farms in country 
 
 
 
Note! 
 
 
 
 
 
More 
plausible case 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note, this rate 
for the more 
plausible case 
is very low! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This reflects 
the fact that it 
is expected 
that only 1 
positive farm 
will ship at 
once, but if it 
ships then it is 
expected that 
7 positive 
animals will 
be shipped. 
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farms 
(E): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.01305 * 150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7*16.2*0.00082122/ 
(1-(1-0.00082122)16.2) 
 
 
 
 
(E): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.000265 * 150 
 
 
 
 
(B): ~dbin (0.7,2) 
assuming that n=2 cattle 
are shipped from each 
farm and that the  herd 
prevalence is p=70% 
(4). 
A in 2002: 
probability that 16.2 inf or 
non inf herds ship 10 
animals and that at least 1 
shipment is infected so that 
the consignment is 
infected: 
0.013056, i.e. 1.3% chance 
that at least 1 consignment 
is infected per year. 
 
expected number of 
infected consignments out 
of 150 total in 2002: 
1.958, i.e. about 2 infected 
consignments every year;  
(SD: 1.39026), max 4.739 
infected consignments per 
year.]  
 
expected number of 
infected animals in an  
infected consignment if 
16.2 farms contribute to 
each consignment : 
7.04379 
animals/consignment 
(7/161=0.0435, i.e. 
prevalence in inf 
consignment, which is) 
<<18% (s.below)  
Case 3 
probability that 80.5 
infected or non infected 
herds ship 2 animals each  
and that at least 1 shipment 
is infected so that the 
consignment is infected: 
0.000265 
then 
expected number of 
infected consignments out 
of 150 total in 2002: 
0.03975, i.e. 3.9 % chance 
that 1 consignment is 
infected per year; 
(SD: 0.19935) 
 
expected number of 
infected animals (2 
shipped per farm) per 
shipment from an infected 
farm: 
2 animals (SD: 0.5721, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note, if the 
positive 
animals are 
spread 
maximally 
over farms 
this rate is 
100x higher!!! 
(note: country 
prevalence is 
still <1% pos 
herds (i.e. 
country A 
could still be 
officially 
BTBC free!!!) 
 
The truth is 
situated 
between the 
more plausible 
case and this 
scenario, 
where any 
farm can ship 
including the 
many small 
farms. 
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2*80.5*0.0000064/ 
(1-(1-0.0000064)80.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive animals are 
spread maximally over 
farms. 
(E): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.064126*150 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2*80.5*0.00082122/ 
(1-(1-0.00082122)80.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
95% C.I.: 0 - 2) 
and 
 
expected number of 
infected animals in an  
infected consignment if 
80.5 farms contribute to 
each consignment : 
2.00051 
animals/consignment 
(2/161=0.0124, i.e. 
prevalence in inf 
consignment, which is 
<<18%, i.e. detection limit 
(s.below)  
 
[Worst case with 768 
infected farms in country 
A in 2002: 
probability that 80.5 
infected or non infected 
herds ship 2 animals each 
and that at least 1 shipment 
is infected so that the 
consignment is infected: 
0.064126 
 
expected number of 
infected consignments out 
of 150 total in 2002: 
9.618878, i.e. about 10 
infected consignments per 
year 
(SD: 3.00034), max 
15.6688 infected 
consignments per year.], 
i.e. 6.44% of all 
consignments are positive 
 
 
expected number of 
infected animals in an  
infected consignment if 
80.5 farms contribute to 
each consignment :  
2.066 
animals/consignment 
(2.066/161=0.01283, i.e. 
prevalence in inf 
consignment, which is 
<<18%, i.e. the detection 
limit (s.below)  
 
max total of exported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
If the many 
small farms 
ship few 
animals each 
and the 
positive 
animals are 
spread 
maximally 
between farms 
then there will 
be 2 - 10 
infected 
consignments 
from country 
A exported 
into the 
Netherlands 
per year. This 
adds up to 
max. 70 
positive 
animals 
exported in 
2002. 
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9.657*2.066 
infected animals: 
19.95 infected animals in 
2002 
      
P4 infected consignments are detected during the pre-export controls 
 input assume approach risk estimation output comments 
 No data  
available 
 
From P3: 
Plausible case 1: 
16.2 farms ship 
10 animals per 
consignment and 
probability of at 
least 1 infected 
consignment is:   
0.00010265 or  
expected number 
of infected 
consignments out 
of 150 total in 
2002: 
0.015397  
(SD: 0.12408) 
 
Worst case: 
768 infected 
farms in A in 
2002, then 
1.958 infected 
consignments per 
year 2002 (max. 
4.739) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
From P3: 
Plausible case 2: 
probability that 
80.5 infected or 
non infected 
herds ship 2 
animals and that 
at least 1 
shipment is 
infected so that 
the consignment 
is infected: 
0.0005194 
 
 
10% of 
consignme
nts are re-
tested 
using the 
intraderma
l monotest 
and  
10 
animals/ 
consignme
nt are 
tested 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
There is an entire 
spreadsheet 
(BTBC_16.2f_consign
ment_sens) 
necessary for this 
calculation! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(D) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Case 1: 
The expected number of 
infected consignments 
(given country prevalence 
of 0.0000064) is so small 
that the infected 
consignments will probably 
not be detected if 10 
animals are tested per 
consignment even if  100% 
of consignments will be re-
tested. 
(f.e. probability of detecting 
a positive consignment 
given that there is 1 pos. one 
amongst the 150 total is: 
0.0042 %,  
sampling 10 animals out of 
15 consignments, i.e. 10% 
of consignments, using the 
monotest) 
 
 
 
Case 2 and 3: 
The expected number of 
infected consignments 
(given country prevalence 
of 0.0000064) is so small 
that the infected 
consignments will probably 
not be detected if 10 
animals are tested per 
consignment even if  100% 
of consignments will be re-
tested. 
 
 
 
 
Worst case 2 and 3: 
The max. 10 infected 
consignments/year have 
such a low % of infected 
animals/consignment (<18% 
infected 
The import 
certificates 
from country 
A state that 
the animals 
originate 
from BTBC-
free herds. 
 
There were 
no data 
available 
about export 
controls. 
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expected number 
of infected 
consignments out 
of 150 total in 
2002. 
0.07791, i.e. 7.8 
% chance that 1 
consignment is 
infected per year; 
(SD: 0.27906) 
 
Worst case: 
768 infected 
farms in A in 
2002, then 
9.6570, i.e. about 
10 infected 
consignments per 
year 
(SD: 3.0059), 
max 15.6688 
infected 
consignments per 
year. 
 
An acceptable test 
should have a 
sensitivity of >80% 
animals/consignment, i.e. a 
herd sensitivity of <80% for 
detecting the consignment 
as infected using the 
intradermal monotest, when 
10  animals/consignment are 
tested) that the 
consignments will not be 
detected as infected during 
pre-export controls with 
99.99% chance, i.e. almost 
certainty of missing them. 
 
      
P5 infected animals are detected during the transport 
 input assume approach risk estimation output comments 
 No data available The 
animals 
are not 
checked 
during 
transport 
for intra-
communita
rian trade! 
   
      
P6 infected animals are detected during the inspection controls in the country of 
destination 
 input assume approach risk estimation output comments 
   
10% of 
consignme
nts may be 
re-tested 
by non-
discriminat
ory spot-
checks 
including 
sampling 
 The consignments are not 
re-tested upon arrival in the 
Netherlands 
 
5% of consignments are 
subjected to a document 
check, but physical 
vetchecks are not done and 
no samples are taken in the 
country of destination 
(8) 
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and testing 
for BTBC 
(7). 
 
Even if the 10% of 
consignments were tested 
during non-discriminatory 
spot checks according to the 
EU Directive 90/425/EEC 
(7) then given the low % of 
infected 
animals/consignment all the 
animals /consignment would 
have to be tested in order to 
make a chance of detecting 
the consignment  as 
infected. See comment too, 
because that would not be 
realistic anyways! 
 
Most of the 
animals 
introduced 
through 
intra-
communitari
an trade are 
too young to 
(have) be(en) 
tested for 
BTBC, 
because they 
are about 2 
week-old 
calves, so-
called 
NUKA’s 
 
They must 
originate 
from BTBC 
free herds in 
the country 
of origin. (9). 
But the 
surveillance 
system will 
miss most of 
the infected 
herds. 
 
If BTBC 
infected 
animals were 
introduced as 
NUKA’s or 
beef cattle 
into Dutch 
farms, then 
they would 
have to stay 
>6 months 
there alive 
(about 5 
years) in 
order to 
cause 
outbreaks of 
BTBC 
according to 
(10)  
 
The risk 
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management 
may want to 
improve the 
surveillance 
system in the 
country of 
origin before 
engaging in 
testing the 
animals upon 
entry into the 
Netherlands. 
      
(1) source: FVO mission report 3197/2001  
(2) OIE handistatus reports 2002 
(3) source: Norby et al. 2004 and Monaghan et al. 1994 
(4) using approach (D) and assuming a heard prevalence of 70% in  the endemic state as 
reported by Emmerzaal et al. (1999), it can be shown that the infected herds will be de-
tected with almost certainty if a minimum of 10 animals per farm is tested with the 
intradermal monotest and if the truly infected farms are part of the population tested for the 
routine surveillance system in 2002. 
(5) source: ANIMO data and I&R data (Dutch cattle identification and registration system) 
2002 
(6) (f.e. 24295/100 =243 and 24295/(100*150)= 1.62 
(7) Council Directive 90/425/EEC 
(8) pers. communication VWA 2004 
(9) Council Directive 64/432/EEC, Annex A and 92/65/EEC Article 6 
(10) Roermund et al. 2003 
 
Assumptions about BTBC 
Animals take 8-65 days after birth before they show a maximal immunoresponse, which is 
the base for the intradermal test (Kleeberg 1960). So, testing 2-weekold NUKA’s would 
not generate reliable test results and the EU directives require testing of animals older than 
6 weeks only. We assume that none of the calves younger than 6 weeks has been tested. 
We assume that the NUKA’s represent the general population in their prevalence of 
infection though, because they have been fed non-pasteurized pooled milk on the holdings 
of origin. This milk and vertical transmission are the sources of infection with BTBC. 
The execution of the intradermal monotest is described in Council Directive 
64/432/EEC, Annex B, 19-21. 
Inspection of carcasses at slaughter has a sensitivity of 10% (Bakker en van Zi-
jderveld personal communication, see report van Roermund 2003).  
The four countries under study have a very low incidence of monotest positive cat-
tle. One out of the four is officially free of bovine tuberculosis. 
The definition for tuberculosis-free is given in Council Directive 64/432/EEC, An-
nex A I. below. 
If a herd is endemically infected with BTBC then the herd prevalence is very likely 
to be up to 70% (Emmerzaal et al. 1999) 
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B1.4 The quantitative risk estimation for livestock imported from country C into the 
 Netherlands in 2002 being the source for introducing leptospira spp. 
 
 
P1 
P2 
Farm is infected 
Routine surveillance detects infection in the country of origin 
 input assume approach risk estimation output comments 
 country C 
(2003): 
398.158 total 
cattle population 
(dairy cattle) 
3.875 total 
number of bovine 
herds  
(2721 with >20 
cattle/farm and 
1154 with <20 
cattle/farm; 
 
average 146 
head/farm on 
large farms and 
11 head/farm on 
small farms) (1) 
 
according to the 
officials the 
routine testing 
was stopped in 
2000 (1) 
 
11 herds out of 
21 (51.9%) tested 
were found 
positive in 1995 
(2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Country 
prevalence 
did not 
change 
since 1995 
(2) 
 
Sensitivity 
of the 
MAT test 
is 67% (3) 
 
Sensitivity 
of the 
ELISA test 
is 84.6% 
on average 
(max 
90.8%) 
(4) 
 
 
(C ) 
with 
Beta(11,12) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.478 * 3875 = 
 
 
 
 
(D) 
as long as the herd 
prevalence >0.45 and 
10 animals per herd are 
tested, the herd 
sensitivity using ELISA 
is >99% 
 
 
 
 
  
Expected proportion of 
infected farms in 2003: 
0.478 
(SD: 0.102,  
95% C.I.: 0.284 – 0.678) 
(more decimals: 0.477935) 
 
Expected number of 
infected farms in 2003: 
1852 (all farms) 
1302 (large farms) 
552 (small farms) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It has been 
reported in 
2000 that 
there is a 
routine 
surveillance 
system in 
place in 
country C, 
but the 
authors of 
this study 
could not 
find any 
evidence for 
it. (5) 
 
 
Need to 
inquire data 
to calculate 
the exact 
prevalence 
of 
leptospirosis  
in NMS and 
make 
recommenda
tions for the 
routine 
surveillance 
system 
      
P3 Export consignment includes animals from infected farms 
 input assume approach risk estimation output comments 
 3.942 beef cattle 
exported  from C 
to NL in 2003 (s. 
table 1), (6) 
cattle/farm 
shipped for 
1 
consignme
Number of farms 
contributing to 36 and 
to 1 consignments 
respectively (8): 
  
 
 
 
If there were 
data 
available 
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36   
consignments of 
beef cattle  
average of 110 
cattle/consignme
nt 
  
1 consignment of 
18 head of 
breeding cattle 
(neglected during 
the RA) 
 
nt: 
100  
10  
2  
 
herd 
prevalence 
is 80% 
(7) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fraction of 
larger 
farms 
(>100 
head/farm) 
is 0.25 of 
the total 
population. 
 
 
 
    39;     1.1 
  394;   11 
1971;   55 
 
(E): 
not realistic, because 
average farm sizes are 
much smaller!!! 
Assumed 2 contributing 
farms for the 
calculations! 
 
 
 
 
0.7274486*36 
 
 
 
 
(E): 
It is most plausible that 
the larger farms (>100 
head) will ship at least 
10 animals at once and 
that not all of the very 
small farms will export 
cattle. 
 
 
 
0.9977976 * 36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(B): ~dbin (0.8,10) 
assuming that n=10 
cattle are shipped from 
each farm and that the  
herd prevalence is 
p=80% (7). 
 
 
 
 
8*11*0.478/ 
(1-(1-0.478)11) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
probability that 1.1 infected 
or non infected herds ship 
100 animals and that at least 
1 shipment is infected so 
that the consignment is 
infected: 
0.7274486 
 
expected number of infected 
consignments out of 36 total 
in 2003. 
26.188 
(SD: 2.672), i.e. 26 infected 
consignments per year; i.e. 
72.74% of all consignments 
 
probability that 11 infected 
or non infected herds ship 
10 animals and that at least 
1 shipment is infected so 
that the consignment is 
infected: 
0.9977976 
 
expected number of infected 
consignments out of 36 total 
in 2003: 
35.92 
(SD: 0.281) 
interpretation: 
all exported consignments 
are infected every year … 
 
expected number of infected 
animals (10 shipped per 
farm) per shipment from an 
infected farm: 
8 animals (SD: 1.26, 95% 
C.I.: 5 - 10) 
and 
expected number of infected 
animals in an  
infected consignment if 11 
farms contribute to each 
consignment :  
42.097 
animals/consignment 
(42/110=0.3827, i.e. 
prevalence for inf 
about 
geographical 
clusters of 
farms 
shipping 
cattle for 
export then 
that could be 
incorporated 
in the 
calculations 
at this point. 
 
In 99.9% of 
the cases, we 
are drawing 
calves (<3m) 
from the 
population of 
calves really! 
So, 100 
calves per 
farm should 
come from 
very large 
farms only. 
Which is not 
realistic in 
country C 
 
 
 
Note! 
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42.097 *36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(B): ~dbin (0.8,2) 
assuming that n=2 cattle 
are shipped from each 
farm and that the  herd 
prevalence is p=80% 
(7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2*55*0.478/ 
(1-(1-0.478)55) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52.58 *36 
consignment,  
 
expected total number of 
infected animals in 36 
consignments: 
1515.5 
 
 
probability that 55 infected 
or non infected herds ship 2 
animals and that at least 1 
shipment is infected so that 
the consignment is infected: 
0.999969 
 
expected number of infected 
consignments out of 36 total 
in 2003: 
35.998887 
(SD: 0.03335) 
interpretation: 
all consignments that  would 
be exported to NL include 
positive animals… 
 
expected number of infected 
animals (2 shipped per 
farm) per shipment from an 
infected farm: 
2 animals (SD: 0.5721, 95% 
C.I.: 0 - 2) 
and 
expected number of infected 
animals in an  
infected consignment if 11 
farms contribute to each 
consignment :  
52.58 
animals/consignment 
(52.58/110=0.478, i.e. 
prevalence for inf 
consignment, which is 
>detection limit 18% 
(s.below)  
 
expected total number of 
infected animals in 36 
consignments: 
1882.08 
 
      
P4 infected consignments are detected during the pre-export controls 
 input assume approach risk estimation output comments 
 No data available There are   The import 
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And no evidence 
for pre-export 
controls was 
found 
 
 
no pre-
export 
tests 
conducted 
to detect 
leptospiros
is  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
certificates 
from country 
C are not 
required to 
make a 
statement 
about the 
leptospirosis 
status of the 
animals. 
 
The 
regulations 
(9) state that 
animals 
should be 
free of 
clinical signs 
of disease. 
 
      
P5 infected animals are detected during the transport 
 input assume approach risk estimation output comments 
 No data available The 
animals 
are not 
checked 
during 
transport 
for intra-
communita
rian trade! 
   
      
P6 infected animals are detected during the inspection controls in the country of destination 
 input assume approach risk estimation output comments 
   
10% of 
consignme
nts may be 
tested by 
non-
discriminat
ory spot-
checks 
including 
sampling 
and testing 
for 
leptospiros
is (10). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assume there are 
physical spot-checks in 
10% of the 
consignments, where 10 
animals/consignment 
are tested for 
leptospirosis using the 
The consignments are not 
re-tested upon arrival in the 
Netherlands 
 
5% of consignments are 
subjected to a document 
check, but physical 
vetchecks are not done and 
no samples are taken in the 
country of destination 
(8) 
 
if the 10% of consignments 
(4 of 36 consignments) were 
tested during non-
discriminatory spot checks 
(and all are positive) 
according to the EU 
Directive 90/425/EEC (10) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Most of the 
animals 
introduced 
through 
intra-
communitari
an trade are 
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MAT (individual 
sensitivity: 67%; (3)) 
 
There is an entire 
spreadsheet needed for 
this calculation 
(available upon request)
then there is a 19.35 % 
probability of detecting all 4 
positive consignment and a 
80.65 % chance of missing 
1 of the positive 
consignments; the 
individual herd sensitivity 
for detecting 1 positive 
consignment is 98% 
 
  
about 2 
week-old 
calves, so-
called 
NUKA’s 
 
Those young 
animals are 
more likely 
to develop 
clinical 
disease that 
may be 
detected, but 
this cannot 
be 
quantified. 
They are 
more likely 
to shed the 
infectious 
agent and 
infect others 
after loosing 
maternal 
immunity 
(>6-8 w of 
age). 
 
 
If 
leptospirosis  
infected 
animals were 
introduced as 
NUKA’s or 
beef cattle 
into Dutch 
farms, then 
they would 
be able to  
cause 
outbreaks of 
leptospirosis 
in the 
receiving 
herds  
 
 
The risk 
management 
may want to 
improve the 
surveillance 
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system in the 
country of 
origin rather 
than engage 
in testing the 
animals upon 
entry into the 
Netherlands. 
      
(1) official instances in the country of origin and CVO project 2004 
(2) literature report from 1995 quoted anonymously (available upon request) 
(3) Ellis et al. 1986 
(4) Woodward et al. 1997 
(5) Proceedings of an international congress from 2000 ; quoted anonymously (avail-
able upon request) 
(6) source: ANIMO data and I&R data (Dutch cattle identification and registration sys-
tem) 2003 
(7) Blood and Radostits 1989 
(8) (f.e. 3940/100 =394 and 3940/(100*36= 1.1)  
(9) EU Directive 64/432/EEC 
(10) Council Directive 90/425/EEC 
 
Data and assumptions about leptospirosis 
The mean herd prevalence cattle aborting due to leptospirosis was calculated using a beta 
distribution for the abortion rate in cattle. According to literature (Morrow, 1986; Ellis, 
1983; Knott and Dadswell, 1970), at least 10% and up to 50% of the animals abort due to 
Leptospira (<10% are true for L. hardjoe, the most pathogenic in cattle, but abortion rates 
can be up to 30% during acute outbreaks and for L. hardjoe and up to 50% cattle aborting 
are recorded for cattle due to L. pomona and L. serjoe).  
 Using a mean of 0.3 with a variance of 0.01, dbeta ~ (6,14) has a median rate of 0.29 
for aborting cattle (95% C.I.: 0.13 - 0.51). The estimate for the mean percentage of infected 
cattle would be more than 3 times as much per herd. 
 Of the MAT positive cows with abortion, 80% of the fetusses will be infected (Ellis 
et al., 1982). 
 
 
Data and assumptions for country C 
According to the information provided by country C, the surveillance testing for leptospi-
rosis had been done once per year in breeding bulls until 2000. It was reported in 2000, 
that a surveillance system supporting zoonosis prevention, reduction and eradication in-
cluded leptospirosis and bovine tuberculosis was established, but data nor information 
could be collected by the authors of this study. 
 Given the lack of information, a guess for the number of herds infected per country 
per year was made for country C based on literature (due to the anonymous reporting, the 
source cannot be quoted, but is available upon request). In one study from 1995, 11 out of 
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21 farms (52.4% of the farms were positive of which 91 out of 1239 animals tested posi-
tive) examined by serological screening were positive for leptospira.  
 Herd sensitivity for the serological test is assumed to be close to 100%, because all 
animals per consignment slaughtered were tested.  
 The detected leptospira consisted of a blend of L. grippotyphosa (61.8% of animals 
tested), L. serjoe (18.9%), L. iceterohaemorrhagiae and L. copenhageni (5.7%) in conjunc-
tion with L. canicola, L. bulgarica and L. hardjoe. It is reported that no leptospira could be 
recovered form urine nor did the animals show clinical signs of acute leptospirosis. 
 Given the fact that the authors failed to find evidence for a surveillance program to 
monitor or eradicate bovine leptospirosis in country C since 2000, it is assumed that this 
prevalence is representative for the endemic state of country C still today. This could be an 
underestimate though.  
 A mean herd abortion prevalence was estimated as described above (mean 0.3, 95% 
C.I. 0.13 - 0.51). 
 The risk analysis for country C is conducted under the assumption that all cattle ex-
ported to the Netherlands from country C originated from local dairy herds. This could be 
incorrect, but there is no information about other types of holdings available. 
 Number of dairy herds in 2003: 3875 (2721 (70.2%) above 20 head and 1154, 
(29.8%) with less than 20 head of cattle. 
 Mean herd size in 2003: 146 head in the larger dairy herds, 11 head in smaller dairy 
herds. 
 It is assumed that leptospirosis is randomly spread over all dairy farms independent 
of their size. 
 If 52.4% of the herds were infected with leptospirosis, that would imply 2031 herds 
(1,426 large herds and 605 small herds) infected in 2003.  
 Given an average herd number of 146 head for 70.2% of the herds and 11 head for 
29,8% of all herds while assuming 100% true sero-prevalence per herd (all animals in-
fected in the endemic state) this results in: 
20,8196 infected animals on 1,426 larger infected herds and 6,655 infected animals on 605 
smaller infected herds for any type of leptospira in 2003. 
 3.960 animals were imported into the Netherlands in 2003, of which all remained in 
the Netherlands. Of those, there was 1 consignment with 18 head of breeding stock (ne-
glected during the RA) and 36 consignments with on average 110 animals/consignment of 
beef cattle. 
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B2 Overview of relevant regulations 
 
 
B2.1 EU regulations and other international animal health regulations concerning 
 the risk analysis 
 
With regard to animal health: 
- Council Directive 64/432/EEC on animal health problems affecting intra-Community 
 trade in bovine animals and swine. 
- Council Directive 72/462/EEC on health and veterinary inspection problems upon 
 importation of bovine animals and swine and fresh meat from third countries. 
- Council Directive 89/556/EEC of 25 September 1989 on animal health conditions 
 governing intra-Community trade in and importation from third countries of embryos 
 of domestic animals of the bovine species. 
- Council Directive 90/425/EEC of 26 June 1990 concerning veterinary and zootech-
 nical checks applicable in intra- Community trade in certain live animals and  
 products with a view to the completion of the internal market. 
- Council Directive 91/496/EEC of 15 July 1991 laying down the principles governing 
 the organization of veterinary checks on animals entering the Community from third 
 countries and amending Directives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC,  
 Article 8 (a) and 23 (b). 
- Council Directive 92/65/EEC laying down animal health requirements governing 
 trade in and imports into the Community of animals, semen, ova and embryos not 
 subject to animal health requirements laid down in specific Community rules referred 
 to in Annex A (I) to Directive 90/425/EEC. 
- Annex II of Council Directive 97/78/EC laying down the principles governing the 
 organisation of veterinary checks on products entering the Community from third 
 countries and safeguard measures implemented in case of a serious hazard to animal 
 health. 
- Council Directive 97/78/EC laying down the principles governing the organisation of 
 veterinary checks on products entering the Community from third countries and 
 safeguard measures implemented in case of a serious hazard to animal health, Annex 
 II and Annex III. 
 
With regard to semen: 
- Council Directive 2004/205/EC: laying down transitional measures for intra-
 Community trade in semen, ova and embryos of the bovine, porcine, ovine, caprine 
 and equine species obtained in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia,  
 Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia, where semen must com-
 ply to: 
 - Council Directive 88/407/EEC of 14 June 1988 laying down the animal health 
  requirements applicable to intra-Community trade in and imports of semen of 
  domestic animals of the bovine species; 
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 - Council Directive 89/556/EEC of 25 September 1989 on animal health condi-
tions governing intra-Community trade in and importation from third countries 
of embryos of domestic animals of the bovine species(2); and  
 - Council Directive 92/65/EEC of 13 July 1992 laying down animal health re-
quirements governing trade in and imports into the Community of animals, 
semen, ova and embryos not subject to animal health requirements laid down 
in specific Community rules referred to in Annex A (I) to Directive 
90/425/EEC. 
- OIE Terrestrial codes 
 - animal code appendix 3.2.1 about Bovine semen 
 - animal code appendix 3.6.2, article 3.6.2.5 about inactivation of FMD virus in 
milk 
 
With regard to intra-communitarian trade and importation of livestock and animal prod-
ucts from third countries: 
- Council Directive 64/432/EEC on animal health problems affecting intra-Community 
 trade in bovine animals and swine 
- Council Directive 90/425/EEC concerning veterinary and zootechnical checks appli-
 cable in intra-Community trade in certain live animals and products with a view to 
 the completion of the internal market 
- Council Directive 92/65/EEC laying down animal health requirements governing 
 trade in and imports into the Community of animals, semen, ova and embryos not 
 subject to animal health requirements laid down in specific Community rules referred 
 to in Annex A (I) to Directive 90/425/EEC 
 
 
B2.2 FMD-specific regulations  
 
With regard to FMD-free areas  
Council Directive 64/432/EEC, Art. 2(l) defines 'epizootic free area' as an area 20 km in 
diameter in which, according to official findings, for at least thirty days prior to loading 
there has been: (i) no incidence of foot-and-mouth disease, in the case of bovine animals;  
Animals introduced from third countries must originate from epizootic free areas according 
to this directive. 
 
General legislation and particularly FMD: 
Border inspection controls for imports of livestock and products of animal origin from 
third countries rely on documentary and identity checks, physical checks (including clini-
cal inspections of the animals), sampling and laboratory testing for the early detection of 
FMD virus and are regulated by EU-Directive:  
 
97/78/EC (Annex II) laying down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary 
checks on products entering the Community from third countries and safeguard measures 
implemented in case of a serious hazard to animal health and Council Directive 
91/496/EEC (Annex A) laying down the principles governing the organization of veteri-
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nary checks on animals entering the Community from third countries and amending Direc-
tives 89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC. 
 
(Others are: 72/462/EEC on health and veterinary inspection problems upon importation of 
bovine animals and swine and fresh meat from third countries, 89/556/EEC on animal 
health conditions governing intra-Community trade in and importation from third countries 
of embryos of domestic animals of the bovine species). 
 
Physical checks for livestock imported from third countries are regulated by Council Di-
rective 91/496/EEC laying down the principles governing the organization of veterinary 
checks on animals entering the Community from third countries and amending Directives 
89/662/EEC, 90/425/EEC and 90/675/EEC. 
 
Article 8, the official veterinarian must carry out a physical check on animals presented at 
the border inspection post. That check must include, in particular:  
(a) a clinical examination of the animals in order to ensure that they conform to the infor-
mation provided in the accompanying certificate or document and that they are clinically 
healthy. 
 
Article 23 (b): any laboratory tests which it is thought necessary should be carried out or 
which are provided for by Community rules; 
The control of products of animals origin is regulated by Council Directive 97/78/EC lay-
ing down the principles governing the organisation of veterinary checks on products 
entering the Community from third countries, Annex III includes the regulation about 
physical checks of products entering the Community from third countries. 
 
 
B2.3 Regulations specifically for BTBC 
 
Council Directive 64/432/EEC, ANNEX A 
I. Tuberculosis-free bovine animals and herds  
1. A bovine animal is considered to be tuberculosis-free if it shows no clinical signs of 
 tuberculosis nor a reaction to an intradermal tuberculin test carried out in accordance 
 with Annex B not more than thirty days before loading, nor any specific reaction, 
 and when it is from an officially tuberculosis-free bovine herd within the meaning of 
 paragraph 2.  
2. A bovine herd is considered to be officially tuberculosis-free if: (a) all the animals 
 are free from clinical signs of tuberculosis; (b) all the animals over six weeks old 
 have reacted negatively to at least two official intradermal tuberculin tests carried out 
 in accordance with Annex B, the first one six months after completion of disinfection 
 of the stock, the second one six months later and the remainder at one- or two-yearly 
 intervals in the case of Member States whose entire bovine herd is under official 
 veterinary supervision and has a rate of tubercular infection lower than 1 %; (c) no 
 bovine animal has been introduced without a certificate from an official veterinarian 
 showing that the animal has reacted negatively to an intradermal tuberculin test 
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 assessed according to the criteria set out in Annex B 21 (a) and that it comes from an 
 officially tuberculosis-free herd. 
 
Council Directive 92/65/EEC, Article 6 
2. in the case of ruminants: (a) they must come from an officially tuberculosis-free and 
 officially brucellosis-free herd in accordance with Directive 64/432/EEC or Directive 
 91/68/EEC and satisfy, as regards animal health rules, the relevant requirements laid 
 down for the bovine species in Article 3 (2) (c), (d), (f), (g) and (h) of Directive 
 64/432/EEC or Article 3 of Directive 91/68/EEC; (b) where they do not come from a 
 herd meeting the conditions laid down in (a), they must come from a holding in 
 which no case of brucellosis or tubercolosis has been recorded in the 42 days prece-
 ding loading of the animals and in which the ruminants have, in the 30 days prior to 
 their dispatch, undergone with negative results a tuberculosis reaction test. 
 
 
B2.4 Regulations specifically for leptospirosis 
 
It is not required by the EU regulation 64/432/EEC to ship leptospirosis-free cattle during 
the intra-communitarian trade. The directive states that animals must be BTBC-free, 
brucellosis-free and epizootic-free (such as FMD) and they must not show any signs of 
clinical disease.  
Art 3, 2(iii) it shall, for a least thirty days prior to consignment, have been free from all 
other compulsorily notifiable diseases which are contagious or infectious for the animal 
species in question;  
 
Leptospirosis is not on the list of the compulsorily notifiable diseases. 
 
 
B2.5 Regulations for milk processing 
 
Council Directive 2003/85/EEC: on Community measures for the control of foot-and-
mouth disease repealing Directive 85/511/EEC and Decisions 89/531/EEC and 
91/665/EEC and amending Directive 92/46/EEC (Annex IX, parts A or B) includes the 
regulations for the treatment of raw milk in the case of suspicion or an outbreak of FMD in 
EU member states. The treatments that ensure the destruction of FMD virus in raw milk 
are much more vigorous than the heat-treatment of raw milk intended for the human or 
animal consumption described under Directive 92/46/EEC. 
 
From Council Directive 92/46/EEC, laying down the health rules for the production and 
placing on the market of raw milk, heat-treated milk and milk-based products (Annex C, 
Chapter 1, part 4): 
(a) Pasteurized milk must:  
(i) have been obtained by means of a treatment involving a high temperature for a short 
time (at least 71,7 oC for 15 seconds or any equivalent combination) or a pasteurization 
process using different time and temperature combinations to obtain an equivalent effect;  
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(ii) show a negative reaction to the phosphatase test and a positive reaction to the peroxi-
dase test. However, the production of pasteurized milk which shows a negative reaction to 
the perioxidase test is authorized, provided that the milk is labelled as 'high-temperature 
pasteurized'; (iii) immediately after pasteurization, have been cooled to a temperature not 
exceeding 6 oC as soon as possible. (b) UHT milk must: - have been obtained by applying 
to the raw milk a continuous flow of heat entailing the application of a high temperature 
for a short time (not less than +135 oC for not less than a second) - the aim being to de-
stroy all residual spoilage micro-organisms and their spores - using aseptic opaque 
containers, or containers made opaque by the packaging, but so that the chemical, physical 
and organoleptic changes are minimal, - be of preservability such that no deterioration can 
be observed by means of random sampling checks after it has spent 15 days in a closed 
container at a temperature of +30 oC; where necessary, provision can also be made for a 
period of seven days in a closed container at a temperature of +55 oC. 
 
OIE Terrestrial animal code appendix 3.6.2, article 3.6.2.5: 
describes the procedures for the inactivation of FMD virus in milk. 
 
Treatment of milk to ensure destruction of foot-and-mouth virus 
The following treatments are recognised to provide sufficient guaranties with regard to the 
destruction of the foot-and-mouth disease virus in milk and milk products for human con-
sumption. Necessary precautions must be taken to avoid contact of the milk or milk 
products with any potential source of foot-and-mouth virus after processing. 
 
Milk and milk products intended for human consumption: 
1. Milk intended for human consumption must be subject to at least one of the  
 following treatments:1
 1.1 sterilisation at a level of at least F03;  
 1.2 UHT(1) treatment;  
 1.3 HTST(2) treatment applied twice to milk with a pH equal to or above 7,0;  
 1.4 HTST treatment of milk with a pH below 7,0;  
 1.5 HTST combined with another physical treatment by: 
  1.5.1 either lowering the pH below 6 for at least one hour, or 
  1.5.2 additional heating to 72 °C or more, combined with desiccation. 
2. Milk products must either undergo one of the above treatments or be produced from milk treated in 
accordance with paragraph 1. 
3. Any other treatment shall be decided in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 89(2), in 
particular in relation to raw milk products undergoing an extended period of ripening including a lowering of 
the pH below 6. 
 
 
Milk and milk products not intended for human consumption and milk and milk products 
for animal consumption: 
                                                 
1 UHT= Ultra-High Temperature treatment at 132 °C for at least one second. HTST= High Temperature 
Short Time pasteurisation at 72 °C for at least 15 seconds or equivalent pasteurisation effect achieving a 
negative reaction to a phosphatase test. UHT= Ultra High Temperature treatment at 132 °C for at least one 
second. TST= High Temperature Short Time pasteurisation at 72 °C for at least 15 seconds or equivalent pas-
teurisation effect achieving a negative reaction to a phosphatase test. 
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1. Milk not intended for human consumption and milk intended for animal consumption must be subject 
to at least one of the following treatments: 
 1.1 sterilisation at a level of at least F03;  
 1.2. UHT(3) combined with another physical treatment referred to in either paragraph 1.4.1 or 
1.4.2;  
 1.3 HTST(4) applied twice;  
 1.4 HTST combined with another physical treatment by: 
  1.4.1 either lowering the pH below 6 for at least one hour, or 
  1.4.2. additional heating to 72 °C or more, combined with desiccation. 
2. Milk products must either undergo one of the above treatments or be produced from milk treated in 
accordance with paragraph 1. 
3. Whey to be fed to animals of susceptible species and produced from milk treated as described in para-
graph 1 must be collected at least 16 hours after milk clotting and its pH must be recorded as < 6.0 before 
transport to pig holdings. 
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Appendix C Respondents to the interviews 
 
 
 
The persons listed below were respondents to a formal interview or otherwise involved as 
expert person. 
 
Name Organisation 
Tjeert de Boer LNV-I&R 
Jan Bergsma 
Rik van der Does 
PVE (Productschappen Vee, Vlees en Eieren) 
Debby van Son TLN/SAVEETRA (Samenwerkende Veetransporteurs) 
H.W.A. Swinkels VanDrie Group 
Piet Thijssen NBHV (Nederlandse Bond van Handelaren in Vee) 
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